People's Bank of China
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November 11, 2024 10:06 AM UTC
Details of the Yuan10trn fiscal package show that it is all directed at a debt swap for LGFV’s and repackaging hidden local government debt. This will have little net fiscal stimulus. True fiscal stimulus will be seen for 2025 GDP growth, but it could be delayed until further details are seen
November 4, 2024 7:05 AM UTC
China most likely faces aggressive disinflation rather than Japan style deflation that depress GDP. China is a middle income country with incomplete urbanization/consumption, while China authorities appear more proactive than Japan in the 1990’s. However, support for households remains light, wh
October 24, 2024 10:50 AM UTC
The proposed Yuan1trn capital injection for the six largest banks would be pre-emptive, while China is also quick to merge weaker/failing small to mid-sized banks. However, rising NPL’s; plus, low net interest margins with low policy rates; low nominal GDP and pressure to rollover LGFV/SOE debt wi
October 21, 2024 10:45 AM UTC
Private companies ex property developers have seen a small pay down of debt, but the largest remaining portion of non-financial debt ex LGFV is central and local SOE’s. They have low profitability and have shown few signs of increased leverage. This leaves the onus on fiscal policy.
October 18, 2024 7:30 AM UTC
Q3 GDP and September monthly figures were slightly better than expected. Combined with a speed up of local government spending in Q4 and more completion of uncompleted homes, we change our 2024 GDP forecast to 4.8% v 4.6%. However, despite a further Yuan1.5-2.0trn of fiscal stimulus to come, we st
October 15, 2024 9:30 AM UTC
BRICS can provide a political buffer but not economic, as BRICS are still searching for practical areas for cooperation. However, Donald Trump universal tariffs threats could focus BRICS on more intra EM trade. BRI has already helped to redirect China exports to EM countries, despite the slowdown
October 14, 2024 8:37 AM UTC
Further details of the size of extra central government spending/scaled up local authority purchases of unsold complete homes for affordable housing should be seen late October/early November from the National People Congress. We estimate Yuan1.5-2.0trn in total of extra spending, which leads us t
October 10, 2024 1:35 PM UTC
China housing crisis will likely mean that household debt/GDP flat lines in the coming years like Japan after 1990 and be a headwind for consumption. Meanwhile, the downturn in residential construction is already greater than that experienced by Japan after 1990 and in itself will be remain a stru
October 3, 2024 1:30 PM UTC
Overall, the warning from slow real credit growth on reduced credit supply and demand is the main lesson from the Asia crisis 1997-98. China High FX reserves; low borrowing overseas and dominance of domestic investors in Yuan markets argues against a currency crisis. Asia widespread banking cris
September 24, 2024 8:54 AM UTC
Growth is benefitting from momentum in public investment/exports and high tech production. However, domestic demand is slower and this is a drag on H2 2024 and 2025 growth prospects. Aside from the ongoing negative drag from the residential construction crisis, consumption is also softe
September 24, 2024 8:39 AM UTC
China has surprised and cut the 7 day reverse repo rate by 20bps to 1.5%, with a 50bps cuts in the RRR rate. Combined with other measures this is a step-up in support and could help GDP on the margin, but the measures are not game changers as monetary policy is currently ineffective. While furth
September 18, 2024 8:05 AM UTC
The good news is that China’s 19 major domestic systemically important banks (D-SIB’s and 72% of loans) hold up well under most solvency and liquidity tests, though some capital shortfalls start to appear with a moderate or severe NPL sensitivity shock scenario. The safety net would likely be
September 16, 2024 6:58 AM UTC
China August data was worse than expected and confirms the weak trend in H2, with retail sales a real worry. The government risks missing the 5% growth target for 2024 and targeted fiscal policy moves are likely, but need to be implemented quickly. 10bps cut in the 7 day reverse repo rate is also
September 9, 2024 9:15 AM UTC
We remain strategically underweight China Equities in global and EM equity baskets, due to the structural slowing of growth and low EPS prospects. Event risk around the U.S. presidential election will also start to be considered. Further targeted policies from China authorities could cause inter
September 2, 2024 10:55 AM UTC
We see a 30% probability of a harder landing in China GDP growth in 2025, which we most likely be in the 3-4% region but could persist into 2026 (Figure 1). A large than projected slowdown in consumption would be a key concern, alongside persistently moderate negative deductions from residential
August 28, 2024 1:30 PM UTC
China consumption patterns are divergent; slowing and becoming more volatile at a sub sector level. Less certainty over new employment and wage growth, plus wealth worries over housing are some of the causes. We forecast GDP to slow in H2 and be 4.0% in 2025.
August 21, 2024 9:00 AM UTC
Though China’s authorities have taken some action to help the residential construction sector, the negative drags from the huge excess completed housing and uncompleted projects continues to weigh directly on the construction/steel and cement sector and consumer confidence. Aggressive policy actio
August 15, 2024 6:40 AM UTC
Overall, the July data is consistent with our forecast of a weaker H2 and we still look for 4.7% GDP growth for 2024. The data is also consistent with our forecast of 4.0% in 2025 GDP growth. Consumption behavior could stall further and cause more of a drag than we anticipate and we now see a 30
July 23, 2024 8:15 AM UTC
Uncertainty over income and employment, adverse wealth effects from lower house prices, plus growing risk aversion, will likely mean that consumption continues to struggle. This is one of the key reasons why we forecast slower H2 GDP growth and look for 4% in 2025.
July 22, 2024 8:41 AM UTC
China 10bps cut in the 7 day reverse repo rate and 1 and 5yr Loan Prime Rate (LPR) was sooner than expected, as a move had not been anticipated until the Fed cuts rates. However, this is not the start of a new aggressive policy phase, but rather a tactical move given the targeted nature of easing.
July 15, 2024 7:33 AM UTC
We are revising down our 2024 GDP forecast from 4.9% to 4.7%, both due to the weaker than expected Q2 GDP figure but also the weak underlying momentum of consumption. Some further targeted policy measures are likely in the coming months, but will struggle to lift economic momentum.
July 10, 2024 7:27 AM UTC
China disinflation process is clear in the June CPI data, with excess production and soft consumer spending producing a lower than expected outcome. Combined with weak M2 money growth, parts of China economy remain weak and point to a softening of GDP growth in H2. However, policy action will li
July 2, 2024 8:10 AM UTC
The 3 plenum July 15-18 will likely see some additional measures that will support or stimulate China economy. However, they are unlikely to be game changers, such as a Yuan2-4trn program of buying most unsold homes or structural increase in the unemployment/health and pension safety nets to free
June 19, 2024 9:35 AM UTC
Public investment and industrial production in high tech and renewables are helping to support growth and should get the economy close to 5% in 2024. However, underneath the surface, consumption is slowing, private sector investment and employment growth is sluggish, and residential property inves
June 17, 2024 6:59 AM UTC
Overall the May data suggests that enough momentum exists for Q2 GDP to be above 5.0% Yr/Yr, which given the Q1 GDP figure means that the odds are good that the 2024 5.0% GDP target can be meet. However, we see a softer of H2 GDP and 4.0% GDP in 2025, given weak domestic demand is unlikely to chan
June 12, 2024 7:34 AM UTC
China disinflation is clear in the latest numbers for May, with core falling 0.2% on the month. Further stimulus will likely arrive in the form of monetary easing. While it is a close call, we look for a 10bps cut in the medium-term lending facility rate (MLF) from 2.50% on June 17.
June 3, 2024 9:19 AM UTC
China authorities appear to have the financial stability spill over from the property sector until control currently, through a combination of direct support for housing and forced mergers of weak banks (mainly rural so far). This game plan will likely be followed for the next few years. However,
May 15, 2024 9:55 AM UTC
While part of corporate debt is quasi government (SOE and LGFV’s) and China creditors can be pursued to rollover by the authorities for larger borrowers, households and part of the private sector are focused on the previous buildup of debt. With China authorities reluctant to aggressive ease fis
May 13, 2024 7:54 AM UTC
The latest China money supply and lending figures show that private household and business lending is very subdued. More need to be done to boost credit demand as well as credit supply. However, the authorities desires to avoid too much Yuan weakness will likely mean that the next move is a 25bp
May 8, 2024 2:20 PM UTC
China equities can see a tactical bounce of 5-10% in the coming months. Cheap valuations and underweight global fund positions means that the scale of pessimism only has to get less bad on the economy and China authorities attitude towards businesses. While we see a tactical opportunity, we do
May 3, 2024 10:45 AM UTC
While U.S. economic developments, plus Fed policy prospects, will be important in terms of EM currency developments, domestic politics and fundamentals will also be decisive. These can keep the South Africa Rand volatile in the remainder of 2024, given the risk of a coalition government and African
May 2, 2024 10:50 AM UTC
Politburo statement in late April suggests extra support for residential property. However, we see this as being incremental rather than any game changers and we still see residential investment remaining a negative drag on 2024 GDP growth.
April 29, 2024 1:00 PM UTC
We feel that a devaluation of the Yuan is unlikely in 2024, both to avoid potentially politically destabilizing capital outflows but also to avoid upsetting the next U.S. president. Policy is geared more towards controlled depreciation to help competiveness but reduce other risks. The Yuan has a
April 16, 2024 8:33 AM UTC
Q1 GDP upside surprise was driven mainly by public sector investment. With the government still to implement the Yuan 1trn of special sovereign bonds for infrastructure spending, public investment will likely remain a key driving force. However, the breakdown of the March data show that retail s
March 20, 2024 11:00 AM UTC
China’s 5% growth target will likely be tough to meet with residential property investment likely to knock 1.0-1.5% off GDP and net exports a small negative. With sluggish private investment, this means some of the old engines of growth are not firing. Some additional fiscal stimulus will likely
March 18, 2024 8:28 AM UTC
The February monthly data shows unbalanced growth. Industrial production and public investment picked up, but retail sales slowed and residential property remains a negative drag on GDP. While H1 GDP growth will be ok, it will likely slow in H2 and we still stick to a forecast of 4.4% for 2024 a
March 15, 2024 8:51 AM UTC
Bottom Line: The PBOC decided not to cut the Medium-Term Facility (MTF) rate, but surprised by also withdrawing liquidity in what looks like a protest at the recent decline in government bond yields. A 10bps MTF cut should still arrive in Q2, but later rather than sooner.
March 11, 2024 8:29 AM UTC
Bottom Line: February China CPI surged to +0.7% v -0.8% Yr/Yr due to three factors. The late lunar New Year boosted CPI seasonally, while the good lunar New Year also boosted pork/food prices and travel prices. The bounce is unlikely to be sustained and we see a fall back to 0.3-0.4% Yr/Yr in Ma
March 5, 2024 9:43 AM UTC
Bottom Line: China’s 5% growth target will likely be tough to meet with residential property investment likely to knock 1.0-1.5% off GDP and net exports a small negative. With sluggish private investment, this means the old engines of growth are not firing. Some additionally fiscal stimulus will
March 4, 2024 10:30 AM UTC
Bottom Line: Taiwan new speaker, Han Kuo Yu, has a willingness to open dialogue with China. This does not stop China likely undertaking large scale military exercises in the spring around Taiwan, as it still seeks to pressure the incoming DPP president. However, we see the new Taiwan speaker elect
February 28, 2024 10:15 AM UTC
Bottom Line: China authorities leave the impression that further policy stimulus will likely be measured rather than aggressive. We feel that they are not pessimistic enough on the medium-term hangover from the residential property sector and this is why we are downbeat on 2024 GDP growth and beyo
February 21, 2024 11:00 AM UTC
Despite a still overvalued Yuan, China authorities are reluctant to accept too much Yuan weakness for fear of causing domestic capital outflows and discontent with China’s government. At some stage, if GDP growth surprises on the downside, China authorities could decide that a controlled Yuan decl
February 20, 2024 9:17 AM UTC
A larger than expected 25bps cut in the 5yr Loan Prime Rate (LPR) has been delivered, but the 1yr LPR rate was unchanged given that PBOC reluctance to cut the 1yr Medium-Term Facility rate (MTF) this month. The 5yr LPR rate is not a game changer for residential property, as bigger policy moves are
February 13, 2024 10:34 AM UTC
Though economics would argue for a 4.5-5.0% growth target for 2024, politics will likely mean that a 5% growth target is chosen in March. With the residential property overhang, weak net exports with a shift of global supply chains and sluggish private sector business investment growth, this will
January 17, 2024 9:24 AM UTC
Quarterly GDP is interesting and came in at 1.0% after the 1.3% quarterly gain in Q3. The trend in quarterly GDP (Figure 1) is also not consistent with 5% growth and the Yr/Yr will dip in Q1 2024 when the large gain in Q1 2023 drops out (due to the end of zero COVID policies). We maintain the 4.
January 12, 2024 9:25 AM UTC
Pressure is growing for a medium-term Facility rate cut and a high chance exists on a 10bps cut on either January or February 15 to 2.40%. We also pencil in a PBOC RRR cut of 25bps for March. Currently negative inflation will swing positive, but only to 0.9% for 2024 and we also see GDP growth at
January 5, 2024 9:00 AM UTC
The catch-up productivity argument would point towards 4-5% growth in China in the 2025-2030 period. However, we are concerned that the residential property downturn and rewiring of global supply chains will be persistent headwinds for China GDP growth in the coming years and that the adverse popu
December 27, 2023 1:23 PM UTC
Latest IMF COFER data shows that the USD reserve status is not slipping away quickly, but only slowly. Two themes to watch in 2024 is the pace of China’s ongoing switch from U.S. Treasuries to other assets including gold and also G7 ideas of confiscating Russian FX reserves.
December 15, 2023 10:06 AM UTC
Bottom Line: Two of the normal drivers of China growth will continue to falter. Residential property investment will be restrained by the overhang on unsold properties; weakness of property developers and a sceptical household sector. Meanwhile, exports are being hurt by a shift of global supply