People's Bank of China
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August 20, 2025 10:25 AM UTC
· Overall, we would attach a 50% probability to a trade framework deal being announced in Q4, though this is unlikely to be comprehensive and could merely be a collection of measures. Even so, the risk also exists of trade negotiations dragging onto 2026 and then reaching a deal or fa
August 19, 2025 8:05 AM UTC
China’s diversification from U.S. Treasuries appears to be at a slow pace. Gold is the obvious alternative if geopolitical tensions were to rise or skyrocket in the scenario of a China invasion of Taiwan. However, Gold holdings are merely creeping higher and suggesting no urgency from China
August 15, 2025 7:03 AM UTC
• Retail sales sluggishness reflects households cautious due to the hit to housing wealth and uncertainty over jobs and wage growth. Investment softness reflects not only residential property weakness, but also a slowdown in government infrastructure. This weakness could see a top up fi
August 13, 2025 8:05 AM UTC
Overall, some of China’s private businesses and households are suffering from Japan’s style balance sheet recession. Combined with slowing productivity and a shrinking workforce, this points to slower trend growth in the coming years. However, fiscal stimulus and the clean-up of Loca
July 29, 2025 8:20 AM UTC
· Our baseline (Figure 1) remains that a U.S./China deal will be reached (most likely in Q4), but a moderate probability exists of no deal being done this year and China being stuck with 30% tariffs – the worst-case scenario of still higher tariffs is now less likely with Trump in a
July 15, 2025 7:30 AM UTC
• We do see H2 weakness relative to H1, as exports to the U.S. will slow again and the effects of the government consumption trade in programs fades. However, H1 has been higher than our forecasts and thus we are revising 2025 GDP growth to 4.8% v 4.4% previously. We keep 2026 GDP growt
July 4, 2025 9:00 AM UTC
Last October, China’s government support package has helped turn residential property less negative and our baseline is that residential property will likely deduct around 0.75% from 2025 growth and 0.5% from 2026. However, the risks for the economy could turnout worse than our baseline view on
June 30, 2025 7:30 AM UTC
· Japan, S Korea and Australia could eventually agree to some extra commitment to increase (self) defence spending in the next 5-10 years though perhaps not targets like NATO countries. This could come as part of the trade deal negotiations currently underway. Japan and S Korea
June 20, 2025 7:30 AM UTC
• China GDP growth remains reasonable though unbalanced. Net exports will take a hit from the trade freeze in April/May, with the impact likely to ease in H2 with the trade truce. We attach a 65% probability to a U.S./China reaching a new trade deal that reduces the minimum overall tari
June 16, 2025 7:25 AM UTC
• Retail sales in May was helped by government trade in programs, but the overall retail sales momentum is reasonable. The industrial production slowdown looks to have been driven by the U.S. tariff chaos in April/May, which has become less adverse after the Geneva trade truce with the U.
June 9, 2025 7:27 AM UTC
May China CPI remains negative Yr/Yr, but the breakdown is consistent with disinflation rather deflation. Deflation could end up as a drag on the economy, but while growth remains close to the 5% target and CPI is regarded as disinflation rather than deflation, further policy easing will be slow.
June 4, 2025 8:32 AM UTC
China is suffering a credit demand problem from households overexposed to property and private businesses that are cautious. Meanwhile, the latest IMF banking stress tests shows sections of the banking system remain weak and this is restraining lending. We remain watchful of money and credit tre
April 16, 2025 8:24 AM UTC
• The March data releases from China alongside the Q1 GDP figures show a good start for 2025. However, underlying domestic demand is soft and Q2 will see a big hit from the U.S. tariffs already introduced. Our baseline (here) remains for a truce in the coming weeks and a scale back of 1
March 24, 2025 9:00 AM UTC
We look for 4.5% GDP growth in 2025. Though residential property investment will subtract less from GDP growth, net exports will also be a drag on the economy in 2025 due to the trade war with the U.S. Further fiscal stimulus beyond March’s NPC measures will be required to achieve a 5% GD
March 17, 2025 9:17 AM UTC
Headline industrial production and retail sales were better than expected, but the breakdown of the data shows a mixed picture for consumption and residential investment remains a negative drag on GDP before the 20% U.S. tariffs hits. Meanwhile, though the weekend policy announcement on boosting d
March 11, 2025 8:45 AM UTC
• The PBOC will likely cut slowly and gradually, as China seeks to avoid Yuan depreciation that could worsen the trade war with the U.S. Additionally, MOF last week forecast nominal GDP of 5%, which with a real GDP target of 5% means that MOF is also forecasting zero inflation. Close to
March 6, 2025 7:55 AM UTC
China announced some fiscal stimulus to help meet the expected 5% GDP target for 2025. Overall, we have not been surprised by the fiscal stimulus measures announced so far from the March NPC, that have been towards the lower end of expectations. However, officials on Thursday have hinted that mo
February 28, 2025 9:05 AM UTC
· Trump eventually wants a trade deal with China and this could occur by the end of 2025, but the U.S. will ask for penalties if targets for U.S. imports to China are not met and this will lead to difficult negotiations. Reciprocal and product specific tariffs on China are also likely i
February 25, 2025 9:30 AM UTC
• China is currently reluctant to see Yuan depreciation as it wants to get the U.S. to the negotiating table for a revised phase 1 trade deal and also over concerns about domestic capital outflows. Cuts to the 7-day reverse repo rate are now likely to be in 10bps steps and we look for the
February 14, 2025 10:45 AM UTC
Overall, we maintain the view that parts of China’s household sector are showing signs of a balance sheet debt consolidation, due to the excess buildup of debt in the past 20 years relative to disposable income. The non-financial corporate sector is more difficult to interpret, due to strengt
February 6, 2025 2:30 PM UTC
New U.S. trade deals will likely make slow progress in reducing bilateral trade deficits as the underlying drivers behind the U.S. trade deficit are macro forces. While the U.S. economy outperforms other major trading partners; the value of the USD remains overvalued and as long as tariffs are
February 4, 2025 10:02 AM UTC
China’s targeted and measured counter tariffs against the U.S. are designed to push the U.S. towards the negotiating table on the wider issue of the U.S./China trade deficit. Negotiating will likely start into the spring, but negotiating will be tough as the U.S. wants a phase 2 deal with new ob
February 3, 2025 3:45 PM UTC
While innovation from China’s technology initiatives can provide help to cross over productivity, the benefit will likely only be modest due to the downgrading of the private sector in China and the lack of openness to inward trade. The structural slowdown in capital productivity will dominate
January 7, 2025 8:35 AM UTC
China’s authorities are reluctant to see too quick a decline in the Yuan, as it could accelerate capital outflows and cause political unrest for the communist party. Thus the preference remains for controlled declines in the Yuan with declines followed by periods of forced stabilization. We do
January 2, 2025 8:05 AM UTC
Brazil and South Africa suffer from debt servicing costs outstripping nominal GDP, which will remain a concern unless a consistent primary budget surplus is seen – though S Africa enjoys a much longer than average term to maturity than Brazil. India and Indonesia, in contrast, enjoy nominal
December 17, 2024 11:00 AM UTC
We do see a package of stimulative fiscal policy measures for 2025 including Yuan1-3trn infrastructure spending; Yuan1trn funds to buy completed homes for affordable housing and Yuan1trn capital injection to the big six state banks. Some modest measures for low-income households and to boost soci
December 9, 2024 9:01 AM UTC
China December Politburo statement has signalled a step up in easing, with monetary policy to become “moderately loose” for the 1st time since the GFC. We now look for 40bps of 7-day reverse repo rate cuts across H1 2025, though a surprise move cannot be ruled out for December – we see a 50bps
November 27, 2024 11:05 AM UTC
China labor force will likely not grow in the remainder of the decade, due to falling population; reluctance to consider large-scale inward immigration; a female participation rate that is high by EM standards and limited growth in employment among those over 55. Meanwhile, education and rural to
November 11, 2024 10:06 AM UTC
Details of the Yuan10trn fiscal package show that it is all directed at a debt swap for LGFV’s and repackaging hidden local government debt. This will have little net fiscal stimulus. True fiscal stimulus will be seen for 2025 GDP growth, but it could be delayed until further details are seen
November 4, 2024 7:05 AM UTC
China most likely faces aggressive disinflation rather than Japan style deflation that depress GDP. China is a middle income country with incomplete urbanization/consumption, while China authorities appear more proactive than Japan in the 1990’s. However, support for households remains light, wh
October 24, 2024 10:50 AM UTC
The proposed Yuan1trn capital injection for the six largest banks would be pre-emptive, while China is also quick to merge weaker/failing small to mid-sized banks. However, rising NPL’s; plus, low net interest margins with low policy rates; low nominal GDP and pressure to rollover LGFV/SOE debt wi
October 21, 2024 10:45 AM UTC
Private companies ex property developers have seen a small pay down of debt, but the largest remaining portion of non-financial debt ex LGFV is central and local SOE’s. They have low profitability and have shown few signs of increased leverage. This leaves the onus on fiscal policy.
October 18, 2024 7:30 AM UTC
Q3 GDP and September monthly figures were slightly better than expected. Combined with a speed up of local government spending in Q4 and more completion of uncompleted homes, we change our 2024 GDP forecast to 4.8% v 4.6%. However, despite a further Yuan1.5-2.0trn of fiscal stimulus to come, we st
October 15, 2024 9:30 AM UTC
BRICS can provide a political buffer but not economic, as BRICS are still searching for practical areas for cooperation. However, Donald Trump universal tariffs threats could focus BRICS on more intra EM trade. BRI has already helped to redirect China exports to EM countries, despite the slowdown
October 14, 2024 8:37 AM UTC
Further details of the size of extra central government spending/scaled up local authority purchases of unsold complete homes for affordable housing should be seen late October/early November from the National People Congress. We estimate Yuan1.5-2.0trn in total of extra spending, which leads us t
October 10, 2024 1:35 PM UTC
China housing crisis will likely mean that household debt/GDP flat lines in the coming years like Japan after 1990 and be a headwind for consumption. Meanwhile, the downturn in residential construction is already greater than that experienced by Japan after 1990 and in itself will be remain a stru
October 3, 2024 1:30 PM UTC
Overall, the warning from slow real credit growth on reduced credit supply and demand is the main lesson from the Asia crisis 1997-98. China High FX reserves; low borrowing overseas and dominance of domestic investors in Yuan markets argues against a currency crisis. Asia widespread banking cris
September 24, 2024 8:54 AM UTC
Growth is benefitting from momentum in public investment/exports and high tech production. However, domestic demand is slower and this is a drag on H2 2024 and 2025 growth prospects. Aside from the ongoing negative drag from the residential construction crisis, consumption is also softe
September 24, 2024 8:39 AM UTC
China has surprised and cut the 7 day reverse repo rate by 20bps to 1.5%, with a 50bps cuts in the RRR rate. Combined with other measures this is a step-up in support and could help GDP on the margin, but the measures are not game changers as monetary policy is currently ineffective. While furth
September 18, 2024 8:05 AM UTC
The good news is that China’s 19 major domestic systemically important banks (D-SIB’s and 72% of loans) hold up well under most solvency and liquidity tests, though some capital shortfalls start to appear with a moderate or severe NPL sensitivity shock scenario. The safety net would likely be
September 16, 2024 6:58 AM UTC
China August data was worse than expected and confirms the weak trend in H2, with retail sales a real worry. The government risks missing the 5% growth target for 2024 and targeted fiscal policy moves are likely, but need to be implemented quickly. 10bps cut in the 7 day reverse repo rate is also
September 9, 2024 9:15 AM UTC
We remain strategically underweight China Equities in global and EM equity baskets, due to the structural slowing of growth and low EPS prospects. Event risk around the U.S. presidential election will also start to be considered. Further targeted policies from China authorities could cause inter
September 2, 2024 10:55 AM UTC
We see a 30% probability of a harder landing in China GDP growth in 2025, which we most likely be in the 3-4% region but could persist into 2026 (Figure 1). A large than projected slowdown in consumption would be a key concern, alongside persistently moderate negative deductions from residential
August 28, 2024 1:30 PM UTC
China consumption patterns are divergent; slowing and becoming more volatile at a sub sector level. Less certainty over new employment and wage growth, plus wealth worries over housing are some of the causes. We forecast GDP to slow in H2 and be 4.0% in 2025.
August 21, 2024 9:00 AM UTC
Though China’s authorities have taken some action to help the residential construction sector, the negative drags from the huge excess completed housing and uncompleted projects continues to weigh directly on the construction/steel and cement sector and consumer confidence. Aggressive policy actio
August 15, 2024 6:40 AM UTC
Overall, the July data is consistent with our forecast of a weaker H2 and we still look for 4.7% GDP growth for 2024. The data is also consistent with our forecast of 4.0% in 2025 GDP growth. Consumption behavior could stall further and cause more of a drag than we anticipate and we now see a 30
July 23, 2024 8:15 AM UTC
Uncertainty over income and employment, adverse wealth effects from lower house prices, plus growing risk aversion, will likely mean that consumption continues to struggle. This is one of the key reasons why we forecast slower H2 GDP growth and look for 4% in 2025.
July 22, 2024 8:41 AM UTC
China 10bps cut in the 7 day reverse repo rate and 1 and 5yr Loan Prime Rate (LPR) was sooner than expected, as a move had not been anticipated until the Fed cuts rates. However, this is not the start of a new aggressive policy phase, but rather a tactical move given the targeted nature of easing.
July 15, 2024 7:33 AM UTC
We are revising down our 2024 GDP forecast from 4.9% to 4.7%, both due to the weaker than expected Q2 GDP figure but also the weak underlying momentum of consumption. Some further targeted policy measures are likely in the coming months, but will struggle to lift economic momentum.
July 10, 2024 7:27 AM UTC
China disinflation process is clear in the June CPI data, with excess production and soft consumer spending producing a lower than expected outcome. Combined with weak M2 money growth, parts of China economy remain weak and point to a softening of GDP growth in H2. However, policy action will li