China
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August 14, 2026 7:05 AM UTC
• China could reduce its excess current account surplus by a package of real Yuan appreciation; industrial policy reform to clean up excess production and structural boosts to safety nets that can sustainably boost consumption share in GDP. China authorities are reluctant to adopt these

August 12, 2026 7:55 AM UTC
· Our view remains that major EM currencies outlooks are being driven by relative domestic fundamentals versus the U.S. No major tensions are being seen from rising U.S. Treasury yields and Fed tightening fears. H2 2026 will likely see the choppy EM FX conditions continue against the

August 10, 2026 7:55 AM UTC
· Given China’s coastguard recent actions, we now raise the probability of a full quarantine of Taiwan shipping to 20% versus 10-15% in 2027/28 (Figure 2), with the probability of some further measures beyond radio requests now above 50% in 2027/28 and in our baseline. Quarantine meas

August 5, 2026 7:40 AM UTC
• Overall, we feel that recent movements have been a correction/consolidation in the AI equity story. AI specific revenue growth still remains healthy and will support multi-year plans over cloud computing growth and in turn semiconductor demand. Even so, slowing free cash flows and ove

July 28, 2026 10:55 AM UTC
· China general government debt/GDP is on an unstable upward trend. China authorities are reluctant to ease underlying fiscal policy more than the already large primary budget deficit, but are also reluctant to consider broadening of income tax or property taxes that would help fiscal

July 20, 2026 8:00 AM UTC
· Asset Price Index (API) framework suggests the US gap is elevated and, on some constructs, has moved into top-decile territory.
· The question is whether prices, capex and financing conditions are beginning to reinforce the same cyclical risk-accumulation dynamics.
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July 16, 2026 6:32 AM UTC
China’s June activity data displayed divergence of statistics, as AI and related infrastructure boost industrial production. Urban Fixed Asset Investment was still depressed, due to on-going failure of mainland developers, retail sales still remained modest , weighed down by the wealth effect from

July 15, 2026 8:05 AM UTC
· The AI trade in financial markets is also a question of credit markets, given the scale of financing needs is using up hyperscalers free cash flow at a rapid rate and the AI labs heavy financing requirements. Credit markets could become more sensitive, if the AI labs revenue growth sl

July 14, 2026 10:40 AM UTC
· Our baseline remains that the MOU will hold and that the Strait of Hormuz will reopen. Iran can be pressured economically by the U.S. naval blockade being re-established. Additionally, President Trump loves to escalate to de-escalate to get a deal. This is a 60% probability scenar

July 7, 2026 9:45 AM UTC
• Our assessment is that this ongoing exercise will likely have a small boost to GDP growth. LGFV’s debt restructuring could allow some new borrowing, but the big issue is that LGFV and LG finances are dependent on one off property taxes with the building of new property. The overhang

July 3, 2026 1:05 PM UTC
· Overall, the clearest EM fiscal sinner is Brazil, given its tax revenue/GDP ratio is already very high and requires politically sensitive expenditure cuts after the October election to increase the primary surplus to stabilize the government debt/GDP trajectory and get real bond yield

June 30, 2026 10:45 AM UTC
• While some are becoming wary that AI bust could arrive in coming quarters, AI labs revenue growth has been explosive and this sustains the vertical chain of datacenter demand and commitments for the hyperscalers and also buoyant semiconductor demand. For 2027 and 2028 capital markets re

June 29, 2026 7:10 AM UTC
· We feel that the authorities will pause appreciation at times via FX intervention, but then allow appreciation to restart. We now see further Yuan appreciation to 6.65 by end 2026, though the authorities will be reluctant to see much more. For end 2027 we forecast USDCNY at 6.50

June 24, 2026 7:00 AM UTC
· The difference between 2nd round inflation effects from higher energy prices and 1st round effects that central banks can look through swings on whether the Straits of Hormuz will remain open in the coming months after the U.S./Iran interim agreement (here). Despite some tensions, we

June 24, 2026 6:22 AM UTC
· China’s growth momentum is being sustained by AI/tech and green energy production and investment. However, growth is imbalanced with modest consumption growth, due to adverse housing wealth effects and slow wage/job growth. Overall, we forecast 4.4% for 2026 and 4.2% for 2027. Chi

June 23, 2026 8:00 AM UTC
· Our baseline for the coming quarters is that global FX is moving through a period of dollar bounce and cross-current positioning adjustment, rather than a clean return to the dollar downtrend. The near-term driver is the market's (over) hawkish reading of the June FOMC/Summary of Econ

June 22, 2026 7:05 AM UTC
· In terms of the S&P500, we remain less concerned about high valuations in the tech sector provided AI labs growth remains fast. 12mth fwd information technology are mid-range in the 2020-26 experience rather than at the highs. Even so, heavy equity issuance by tech companies and a s

June 16, 2026 7:22 AM UTC
· Overall, growth remains unbalanced. Momentum in AI/automation leads economic growth, with support from net exports still. However, consumption is not consistent with a 5% growth pace, as adverse wealth effects and a soft labor market mean only modest consumption. While the stimu

June 15, 2026 12:32 PM UTC
· Our baseline (80%) is that the Strait of Hormuz will reopen in H2 2026 and remains open through 2027. However, logistics dislocation plus a switch from commercial inventory rundown to rebuilding will likely slow the decline in oil prices back towards normal levels (Figure 1). O

June 4, 2026 9:55 AM UTC
• The Yuan has been appreciating driven by a large trade surplus; the ongoing trade truce with the U.S. after Trump May visit and official acceptance of Yuan gains. Even so, we feel that China’s authorities will pause appreciation at times via FX intervention to stop the move becoming too

May 29, 2026 11:05 AM UTC
· The most likely option for China is to continue the air and naval grey zone warfare around Taiwan, combined with support for pro-China factions in Taiwan’s parliament to build pressure for reunification at some stage. This stick and carrot approach is our baseline (Figure 1). Wi

May 22, 2026 8:12 AM UTC
A significant demographic tremor is gaining speed and breadth - globally. Just as politics – certainly in the west - is framed around ending or at least reducing and controlling immigration, it seems that the populists at the helm of such thinking are not considering the ramifications of such a

May 15, 2026 11:26 AM UTC
In hosting President Trump this week, China feels it is vying, if not achieving, parity with the U.S. as the world’s superpowers; from China’s perspective, it regards Russia similarly. It does seem as if China’s goal at this summit was to get more effective flexibility in shaping Taiwan’

May 7, 2026 6:25 AM UTC
· Our new baseline (70% probability) is for the Straits of Hormuz to start to partially reopen by June/July based on a framework deal between Iran and the U.S. This means more elevated oil prices in Q2, but then a gradual reduction in WTI to USD85 end-2026 and USD75 end 2027. The al

April 28, 2026 12:35 PM UTC
· EM government bond spreads are controlled as 2nd round inflation effects are likely to be less than 2022, due to less buoyant domestic demand/slacker labour markets and less global supply chain pressure ex oil/oil products. Brazil is expected to cut rates and others will likely not

April 22, 2026 9:17 AM UTC
When Trump aspires to reaching a deal, he thinks in either black or white. But whether it be political, economic or military the reality is that the world is always various shades of grey. This is very much evident in the way the Iran conflict was planned by the U.S. – the expected clear and r

April 17, 2026 12:49 PM UTC
· Any deal between the U.S. and Iran would still be seen as a positive win in equities, as it would raise hopes that it could be followed by a multi-year settlement that could include more Iran oil and gas into the global energy markets and lower energy prices. No deal is also feasible,

April 16, 2026 6:39 AM UTC
• Q1 GDP beat expectations helped by Industrial production, but the domestic demand picture remains weak with soft consumption and the ongoing negative drag from the residential property sector. We still feel that the economy remains too dependent on high tech manufacturing and modest consu

April 15, 2026 12:12 PM UTC
· Fed/ECB and BOE meetings will likely see concern over the potential 2nd round inflation effects from the Iran war, but forecasts seeing inflation coming down in 2027 and no imminent signals of tightening from the ECB/BOE – our baseline remains for easing later in the year, as energy

April 13, 2026 9:58 AM UTC
· Though the U.S. is introducing a blockade on Iran oil exports, we think the U.S. and Iran remain reluctant to restart the war. How Iran responds to the U.S. blockade is important. It could choose to respond by attacking Gulf energy installations before or after the 2-week ceasefir

April 10, 2026 7:37 AM UTC
• Given lags and the still elevated oil prices for Q2/Q3 delivery it is likely that PPI will be further boosted in the coming months. This could boost 2026 China CPI by around 0.3-0.4% and we changed our 2026 forecast to 1.4% in the March Outlook (here) -- the higher price of Fertilizers wi

April 8, 2026 10:09 AM UTC
· The ceasefire will likely involve a new normal of shipping companies paying Iran a toll. While this is adding a cost to Gulf crude oil/products and LNG, the premium will be a lot lower than the cost of an ongoing war. The U.S. and Iran will now likely be reluctant to restart the w

March 31, 2026 10:55 AM UTC
· Any ground-based invasion would likely result in a long war and Iran would likely counter with attacks on energy or other key facilities around the Gulf. Sea and air based invasions are also difficult, while any victory would likely be followed by occupation. WTI oil prices would

March 30, 2026 8:00 AM UTC
· For a 4-8 week war and 3-4 quarters of energy price normalisation, we see a 10% U.S. equity market correction in H1 2026 driven by the current Iran war and/or consumption slowing due to lower (real) wage growth, alongside still stretched valuations in equity and equity-bond terms. T

March 25, 2026 8:45 AM UTC
· EM currencies have seen a correction against the USD since the risk off prompted by the Iran war, but our baseline remains for a 4-8 week war (here) followed by energy prices only returning to pre-war levels by 2027 -- with WTI down to USD80-85 by June; USD65-70 end 2026 and USD60 by

March 24, 2026 7:30 AM UTC
· Our baseline scenario of a 4-8 week war (here) is not a problem, aside from higher prices. We have pushed up our 2026 CPI forecast to 1.4% from 0.5% (higher food prices are also an issue), but as oil/gas prices come down, this suggests very subdued 2027 inflation, which we have cut

March 23, 2026 4:39 PM UTC
· The Iran war macro impact depends on length of the conflict and impact on energy flows. Our baseline is for a 4-8 week Iran war, with WTI down to USD80-85 by June; USD65-70 end December and USD60 by Q3 2027 (here). The jump in oil and gas prices mean at least a temporary increase in

March 23, 2026 4:15 PM UTC
· For global equities, our baseline (here) is for a 4-8 week Iran war, with WTI down to USD80-85 by June; USD65-70 end 2026 by June and USD60 by Q3 2027. A fragile situation will mean it will take until 2027 for energy prices to return to pre-war levels. On a multi-quarter basis thi

March 23, 2026 3:04 PM UTC
· Our central scenario remains a 4-8 week war in Iran. Trump’s loathing of long wars and high gasoline prices will likely prompts the U.S. to declare victory. A formal ceasefire is unlikely, but the end of hostilities could see an informal understanding of the Straits of Hormuz for

March 16, 2026 8:49 AM UTC
· Though the January-February data was better than expected, we expect high oil prices and an adverse effect from the Iran war to hurt China’s export growth. We still feel that the economy remains too dependent on high tech manufacturing and modest consumption will act as a drag on

March 12, 2026 11:37 AM UTC
• The main success of Trump’s visit will be on trade, where an extension of October trade truce is likely. China wants to avoid section 301 tariffs that could increase the current effective tariff of 25% and the U.S. will turn the whole visit into a PR victory for Trump to deflect from

March 11, 2026 9:45 AM UTC
· Our central scenario (75%) remains a multi-week war in Iran. Trump loathing of long wars and high gasoline prices prompts U.S. to declare victory before end of March. Israel and Iran would most likely agree an effective ceasefire. The ceasefire would be fragile, however, as it w

March 10, 2026 10:35 AM UTC
· Voting will be done by 12 FOMC members and while Kevin Warsh could mellow some centrists, 5 district Fed presidents and Barr/Jefferson are at the Fed until at least 2031. Warsh may merely bring interest rate cuts sooner from June or potentially engineer a small dip below the 3% neutra