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March 31, 2026 10:55 AM UTC
· Any ground-based invasion would likely result in a long war and Iran would likely counter with attacks on energy or other key facilities around the Gulf. Sea and air based invasions are also difficult, while any victory would likely be followed by occupation. WTI oil prices would

March 30, 2026 8:00 AM UTC
· For a 4-8 week war and 3-4 quarters of energy price normalisation, we see a 10% U.S. equity market correction in H1 2026 driven by the current Iran war and/or consumption slowing due to lower (real) wage growth, alongside still stretched valuations in equity and equity-bond terms. T

March 24, 2026 8:46 AM UTC
· The multi quarter outlook for DM rates depends on the length of the Iran war Our baseline is that it will be a 4-8 week war (here) and a 3-4 quarter retracement of oil prices back to pre-war levels – longer from Europe and Asian gas prices. We forecast WTI down to USD80-85 by June

March 24, 2026 3:59 AM UTC
• Private consumption is supported by real wage turning positive in 2026. The trend is solidified by early spring wage negotiation results, which major firms agree to hike stronger than 2025 levels. We revised 2026/27 GDP to +1% as wage gains likely to accelerate. We expect 2026 CPI to be s

March 23, 2026 4:39 PM UTC
· The Iran war macro impact depends on length of the conflict and impact on energy flows. Our baseline is for a 4-8 week Iran war, with WTI down to USD80-85 by June; USD65-70 end December and USD60 by Q3 2027 (here). The jump in oil and gas prices mean at least a temporary increase in

March 23, 2026 4:15 PM UTC
· For global equities, our baseline (here) is for a 4-8 week Iran war, with WTI down to USD80-85 by June; USD65-70 end 2026 by June and USD60 by Q3 2027. A fragile situation will mean it will take until 2027 for energy prices to return to pre-war levels. On a multi-quarter basis thi

March 23, 2026 3:04 PM UTC
· Our central scenario remains a 4-8 week war in Iran. Trump’s loathing of long wars and high gasoline prices will likely prompts the U.S. to declare victory. A formal ceasefire is unlikely, but the end of hostilities could see an informal understanding of the Straits of Hormuz for

March 11, 2026 9:45 AM UTC
· Our central scenario (75%) remains a multi-week war in Iran. Trump loathing of long wars and high gasoline prices prompts U.S. to declare victory before end of March. Israel and Iran would most likely agree an effective ceasefire. The ceasefire would be fragile, however, as it w

March 10, 2026 10:35 AM UTC
· Voting will be done by 12 FOMC members and while Kevin Warsh could mellow some centrists, 5 district Fed presidents and Barr/Jefferson are at the Fed until at least 2031. Warsh may merely bring interest rate cuts sooner from June or potentially engineer a small dip below the 3% neutra

March 9, 2026 8:05 AM UTC
· Lower budget revenue and a multi-year hit to tourism and the Gulf role as air transit hubs, could see delays and reduction in some parts of the Gulf states USD3.4 trillion deals with the Trump administration. The economic effects on the U.S. would likely be small and the geopolitics b

March 4, 2026 9:50 AM UTC
• The Trump administration’s objective appears to be pivoting from regime change to hurting Iran ballistic missile capabilities, which argues for a 2-4 week war rather than a prolonged war. However, the most intense missile battles will likely occur in the next one week and markets are

March 2, 2026 7:44 AM UTC
· If the war is short (ie 1-2 weeks) and leads to a ceasefire then the global economic impact will be small, with the greatest impact in the middle east of oil/gas supplies on a temporary basis and tourism. If the war is more prolonged (ie months) then oil/gas supplies could be sque

February 20, 2026 4:31 PM UTC
· The 6-3 vote by the Supreme court and full ruling against reciprocal tariffs means that the Trump administration will likely resort to other tariffs for negotiating leverage. However, the Trump administration will also pressure to codify existing trade framework deals that have be

February 18, 2026 11:55 AM UTC
· The most likely option for China is to continue the air and naval grey zone warfare around Taiwan, combined with support for pro-China factions in Taiwan’s parliament to build pressure for reunification at some stage before 2049 (the 100th anniversary of the communist party). Wi

February 12, 2026 8:05 AM UTC
· The Donroe doctrine has pressured Mexico into halting oil exports to Cuba, which is intensifying pressure on Cuba’s regime. While chaos and attempted mass immigration is a risk, the baseline is for a negotiated deal as U.S./Cuba discussions deepen – though with the added complex

February 4, 2026 12:05 PM UTC
· Portfolio flows have dominated U.S. C/A financing looking at the breakdown of the balance of payment data (BOP), with no material slowdown in 2025 from foreign investors. U.S. investors did accelerate buying of overseas equities but this was counterbalanced by slower U.S. buying of

February 2, 2026 9:22 AM UTC
• For now we see some further profit-taking on risky positions in gold/silver/copper/equities and short USD positions. However, a bigger macro catalyst is required to produce a deep correction in equities and major risk off. The nomination of Kevin Warsh for Fed chair is unlikely to be

January 28, 2026 8:35 AM UTC
Overall, the Trump administration’s hyperactive start to 2026 is unlikely to achieve success on the number one issue for voters in the shape of cost of living concerns. Meanwhile ICE’s immigration tactics in Minnesota are causing concerns among swing voters, though Trump geopolitical adventuri

January 27, 2026 10:53 AM UTC
The Greenland drama and fears of BOJ/Fed Intervention on USDJPY has put the USD under renewed downward pressure against DM Currencies. What happens next? Overall, we see scope for further USD decline versus DM currencies in 2026 on more currency hedging; some diversification away from the U.S.

January 14, 2026 11:55 AM UTC
· We see the most persistent issue being supply (budget deficit + QT) in 2026, which should lessen into 2027 with a slowdown in ECB/BOE QT and a partial U turn by the BOJ. However, governments are also struggling with electorates that are resistant to higher taxes or lower governmen

January 13, 2026 3:26 PM UTC
· The most likely option for China is to continue the air and naval grey zone warfare around Taiwan, combined with support for pro-China factions in Taiwan’s parliament to build pressure for reunification at some stage before 2049 (the 100th anniversary of the communist party). Wi

January 12, 2026 9:55 AM UTC
· Overall, though Trump action can cause volatility in financial markets, the major issues remain the performance of the U.S. economy and whether the current scale of AI optimism will remain. Monthly TICS data since the April reciprocal tariffs show that global investors continue inwa

January 8, 2026 8:05 AM UTC
· A Supreme Court ruling, partially or in full against reciprocal tariffs, would not produce a major slowdown in U.S. inflation or boost to growth, as the Trump administration would be full of threats for replacement tariffs – Trump would be worried about the loss of negotiating pow

January 7, 2026 8:05 AM UTC
· Trump will likely go for more pressure and then seek to negotiate with Denmark and Greenland. Denmark and Greenland already have mutual interests with the U.S. on security; minerals and Russia/China that are already covered by previous agreements and understandings. Trump would li

January 6, 2026 9:58 AM UTC
• For financial markets, the muddle through for global economics and policy provides support for risk assets, combined with solid earnings prospects from some of the magnificent 7. However, U.S. equities are once again significantly overvalued and we look for a 5-10% correction in 2026, b

January 5, 2026 12:02 PM UTC
· Venezuela’s oil production will likely take years to increase substantively due to poor infrastructure, the need for substantive investment, and a lack of democratic political stability. In terms of geopolitics, operations in Venezuela reinforce the Trump administration’s pivot

December 19, 2025 7:15 AM UTC
· Private consumption growth is hindered by negative real wage in Q3 2025 yet Japan continues to demonstrate the structural change in both higher business price/wage setting and consumer behavior. Early signs for 2026 spring wage negotiation are upbeat and should see wage growth at

December 17, 2025 9:21 AM UTC
· Multi quarter, we still look for 50bps of further Fed easing by end 2026, which will likely initially bring 2yr yields down to 3.35%. However, once the Fed Funds rate get closer to 3.0-3.25% and the assumed slowdown turns into a soft landing, the 2yr will likely move to a premium ve

December 17, 2025 7:44 AM UTC
· The U.S. slowdown remains in focus as the lagged effects of President Trump’s tariff increases continues to feedthrough, though our baseline is for a 2026 soft-landing. The Supreme court will likely rule against part of Trump’s reciprocal tariffs, which will create short-term

December 12, 2025 8:05 AM UTC
· The U.S. equity market is underpinned by the bullish AI/tech story and a soft economic landing into 2026. However, overvaluation is clear and this leaves the market vulnerable to a 5-10% correction on moderate bad news e.g. economic data. We see the S&P500 having a choppy year a

December 9, 2025 8:40 AM UTC
· The new NSS at one level reads like a Trump/MAGA current list of topics and desires, that may not translate into policy or a major shift of military assets. Trump has blown hot and cold on Europe and China over the past 12 months and could shift again. Nevertheless, the NSS does r

December 4, 2025 10:05 AM UTC
China will likely escalate pressure on Japan to back down over it less pacifist stance on self-defense, as it wants to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S. One option is to repeat the 2020 copybook when China banned coal imports from Australia for 3 years. A 2nd alternative is grey warfare a

November 24, 2025 10:55 AM UTC
· China will likely suffer slowing consumption from population aging in the coming years, as consumption per head falls for over 55’s and large scale immigration is not a likelihood. China’s household wealth is also heavily concentrated in falling illiquid residential property. Chin

November 21, 2025 8:00 AM UTC
· Net foreign portfolio inflows have not been hurt by Trump’s April tariff drama, with the AI and tech boom attracting new equity inflows. Flows could become more volatile with a U.S. equity bear market or recession, but these are modest risk alternative scenarios rather than high r

November 18, 2025 10:30 AM UTC
· The Fed, ECB and BOE will likely drive further 10-2yr government bond yield curve steepening, with 10yr Bund yields rising due to ECB QT and German fiscal expansion. 10yr JGB yields are set to surge through 2%, as BOJ QT remains excessive and underestimated. The BOJ could partiall

November 17, 2025 1:00 PM UTC
The November Fed financial stability review highlights continued concern over hedge funds and insurance company leverage, while the IMF GSFR is concerned about U.S. equity market overvaluation and growing links between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. However, the main adverse shock wo