Protests Return to Jakarta—No Threat to Regime, But Signal to Watch

Thousands of student protesters took to the streets of Jakarta and other major cities in end-August, voicing their anger over a newly approved Rp50 million (USD 3,050) monthly housing allowance for members of parliament. While public demonstrations are not uncommon in Indonesia’s democracy, the scale and intensity of this latest wave point to broader frustrations with elite privilege, endemic corruption, and a growing disconnect between government rhetoric and youth expectations.

Surface Trigger, Deeper Frustrations

The housing allowance may have been the spark, but the fire has been smouldering for years. The protests have drawn energy from widespread disillusionment with Indonesia’s political class, especially among younger voters who feel alienated by perceived corruption, cronyism, and elite impunity. These issues have persisted across administrations, but the symbolism of lavish benefits amid economic strain has sharpened public anger.

Much of the discontent is now being projected onto President Prabowo Subianto’s government, particularly given the continuity of political patronage structures from the previous Jokowi administration. Ironically, Jokowi’s own son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, became vice-president this year on a campaign that promised youth representation. But his appointment to a low-profile development role in Papua has fuelled perceptions of tokenism and eroded his credibility among the very demographic he was meant to represent.

Political Realignments and Strategic Ambiguity

The protests also unfold amid an increasingly fluid parliamentary landscape. The Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P)—the largest party in parliament and home to Jokowi until recently—has chosen to remain outside the ruling coalition, playing the role of a "balancer" rather than a formal opposition. This positioning gives the PDI-P leverage: it can criticise the government while extracting concessions, such as the recent amnesty for its former secretary-general, Hasto Kristiyanto, who had been sentenced for bribery.

This ambiguity in PDI-P’s stance is strategic. By staying on the fence, it preserves its ability to either challenge the ruling coalition in the next election or join it on favourable terms. In the meantime, the party is likely to use the protests—and the broader narrative of elite arrogance—as political ammunition to undermine President Prabowo’s legitimacy and discredit the coalition’s youth credentials.

What to Expect

Further unrest is likely. Student groups and civil society actors have signalled their intent to sustain the pressure, and with corruption and inequality remaining unresolved, the protests could become cyclical rather than episodic. The government is expected to adopt a two-pronged strategy: containing unrest through security measures while dangling limited concessions or symbolic gestures to placate dissent without reversing key policies.

At the same time, President Prabowo is likely to consolidate power by deepening ties with the military and adopting a more authoritarian posture—both tactics he has used in the past and themes frequently criticised by protesters. This could reinforce short-term political stability within his ruling coalition but risks alienating younger voters and reactivating Indonesia’s long history of student-led political disruption.