Sub Sahara Africa: Country Risk Ratings

Angola (AGO)

Overall risk in Angola remains at a medium high level. President João Lourenço is part of the popular movement for liberation of Angola (MPLA), which saw him once again being the MPLA’S presidential candidate in the 2022 election. Political interference remains high, while legal & regulatory risk also continues at a very high level. Angola’s capital has again seen violent protests through late July, as people respond to the hike in price of diesel earlier in the month. Similarly, in 2023 a petrol price hike caused a parallel course of events, due to the state attempting to gradually remove fuel subsidies this sparked both hikes in 2023 and July 2025. Protests, at current time, have resulted in 22 deaths, 197 people injured and a total of 1,214 arrests. Thus the reasoning for a political violence of medium high rating.

Real GDP growth is forecasted by the IMF at 2.4% in 2025 and a reduced rate of 2.1% in 2026. Angola’s exportation sector continues to rely on petroleum and its increased supply of oil production. However, in early July Angola had revealed the discovery of its first major offshore natural gas, located from the drilling of the Gajajeira-01 well. The discovery of this well, located in the lower Congo basin, will create much needed diversification in Angola’s energy sector beyond oil and attract potential investors. Although risk of doing business remains high, diversification in the energy sector or into other sectors could make this subject to change. Inflation has been a major issue for Angola in the past and still continues to be. According to the IMF, in 2025 inflation is forecasted at 22% before reducing in 2026 to 16.4%. The high inflation is putting pressure on household purchasing power and significantly affecting poverty rates as inflation is far too volatile. This is also leading to less room to ease policy rates, which was kept by the Angolan Central Bank at 19.5% in May 2025. In addition, sovereign non-payment risk is seen to continue at medium high. The IMF depict a general government gross debt of 64.5% in 2025, due to revenues from oil, diversification in the energy sector and also the expectation of oil backed loans with China to reduce by year-end. In 2026 government debt is estimated to reduce to 63.9% in 2026. However, such high rates of debt previously have affected Angola’s ability to invest capital into much needed infrastructure, while being exposed to foreign exchange risk. Thus, supply chain disruption has remained medium high and exchange transfer risk being medium.

Burkina Faso (BFA)

Overall risk remains to be considered high for the West African state, Burkina Faso. Ibrahim Traoré remains the President of Burkina Faso, who seized power in September 2022 through a military coup. Since the coup in 2022, the military rulers have been proposing many controversial reforms. One being the disbandment of the country’s electoral commission with the interior ministry controlling future elections. Another was a nationwide vote due in 2024, however, rulers had extended the period of transition until 2029 meaning Traoré is open to contest the next election. Political interference and legal & regulatory risk remain high and very high. In addition, Burkinabe special forces and militias had been accused of leading an operation that killed at least 130 civilians and displaced many civilians. The civilians are of ethnic Fulanis, which are a Muslim community that the government has linked to backing Islamist militants. Political violence also remains very high, with past attacks from the Jihadist group.

In terms of the state’s economy, Burkina Faso GDP growth is forecast at 4.3% in 2025, and is expected by the IMF to see slight increases to 4.5% in 2026. The agriculture sector has consistently provided towards Burkina Faso’s positive growth rate, appropriate weather conditions and the ability of farmers to return to their previously abandoned lands is allowing the sector to thrive. In addition, recent increases in mining production particularly in gold have benefited Burkina Faso. Nationalisation of five gold mining assets had taken place in June, the three exploration sites and two operating gold mines had been transferred to the state’s-owned miner. Construction of Burkina Faso’s first gold refinery is also planned. Risk of doing business continues to be regarded as high, while relations with Russia and the Russian President are growing. Inflation is expected to rise slightly to 3% in 2025, however, the IMF expect inflation to return back under control with a 2.5% in 2026. In addition, Government debt is seen by the IMF to be 50.2% of GDP in 2025, but expected to see reductions in the upcoming years with 49.8% in 2026. The government continues to stay committed to a fiscal consolidation strategy. Sovereign non-payment risk remains medium high. Finally, the high rate of poverty is to see a slight reduction, while electricity is also very limited through the state becoming an obstacle to economic opportunities. Supply chain risk therefore remains very high.

Cong Rep. (COG)

The Republic of Congo’s overall risk remains high. Denis Sassou Nguesso has remained in Republic of Congo’s presidential role, since his re-election in March 2021 having won every election since 2002. The next round of elections is scheduled for 2026. Prime Minister, Anatole Collinet Makosso, has served as the Prime Minister since his appointment in 2021, which had seen him reappointed twice. Makosso has been prioritising institutional, financial and inclusive governance. Political interference and legal & regulatory risk continue to be very high. In relation to the U.S., Trump had set a travel ban on the Republic of Congo, while 11 other countries also suffer full bans. A decision had been made by Trump’s administration to improve the national security in the U.S., as the Republic of Congo has been accused of having high visa over stay rates. The rate of people remaining in the U.S. over their authorised period of stay had been calculated at a rate of 29.63%. Meanwhile, the climate threat only continues to trouble the Republic of Congo, with forest fire data being released. The Congo Basin rainforest, that spans across both the DRC and the Congo Rep., had seen the highest levels of rainforest lost and declared a global red alert. In addition, infrastructure shows weakness with 67% of people in urban areas having access to electricity and only 12.4% in rural locations, despite the state’s efforts.  Supply chain disruption remained high.

 In terms of the economy, the IMF forecast a GDP growth of 3.3% in 2025, and 3.2% in 2026. Oil continues to be the country’s primary resource, making up 80% of its total exports, however, the Republic of Congo has a large abundance of mineral resources that remain mostly untouched. Projects like the Mbalam-Nabeba Iron Ore Project, which is trying to export iron to Gabon through the use of railway and a port, is still in early development. Diversification has also been a characteristic for a small proportion of growth, in sectors like agriculture and services and helping overall growth. The risk of doing business remains very high. Inflation is currently at a 3.3% rate in 2025, and is expected by the IMF to stabilize at 3% in the next 2 years. Banking sector vulnerability has improved too medium low. Government debt however has not seen much improvement and has become a major issue for the Republic of Congo over the past couple of years. Currently government debt sits at 91.4% of GDP, though the IMF forecast that government debt is to improve over the coming years, with 87.1% in 2026. The government has been addressing cash flow issues through the National Treasury Programme (NTOP) by extending the states maturities. Finally, the Republic of Congo’s currency, the CFA Franc, continues to be pegged to the euro showing no change to the medium high exchange transfer risk.

Ethiopia (ETH)

Ethiopia’s overall country risk rating remains high, with political violence still very high. Some external tensions have eased following the Turkey-brokered deal between Ethiopia and Somalia, that allows Ethiopia sea access under Somali authority. Even so, tensions with Egypt have grown over Egypt’s concerns that their water supplies will be impacted by the start-up of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – to be commissioned from September 2025. The U.S. and Turkey are trying to de-escalate the situation, but without success so far. Internal instability also persists in the Amhara and Tigray regions, with reports of factional tensions within the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). This all means the political interference and supply chain disruption measures are high. On the economic front, growth continues to recover from the Tigray war depressed levels and GDP growth is set to accelerate to 6.6% in 2025.  The latest IMF loan review notes that Ethiopia is meeting reform targets and good growth is forecasted for 2026 at 7.1%. However, inflation is not yet under control despite the only slow crawling currency depreciation and is projected to be 21.5% by the IMF in 2025, declining to 12.2% in 2026. This risks future economic stability. Given the still difficult debt backdrop, the sovereign non-payment risk has remained at high.

Equatorial Guinea (GNQ)

Equatorial Guinea have seen no change in overall risk and remains at high. Teodoro Obiang Nguema continues to hold the presidential role for the African state, he is a military leader and politician who had gained power from his uncle in a coup in 1979. Meanwhile, Manuel Osa Nsue has remained as Equatorial Guinea’s Prime Minister. Political Interference and legal & regulatory risk both remain very high. Likewise with Congo, Equatorial Guinea also suffered a travel ban from the U.S. president Trump. Similarly to other African counterparts, it was for the country’s high overstay rate in the U.S., though slightly lower than Congo at 21.98%. Moreover, a reciprocal tariff of approximately 15% was imposed on the African state as of August 7 2025. Equatorial Guinea however had finally gained a legal claim of the small islands in the Gulf of Guinea, since their ever long dispute with Gabon. In May, the International Court of Justice ruled the Islands in the potentially oil rich waters belonged to Equatorial Guinea, meaning Gabon had to remove its soldiers from the small island of Mbanié. Legal intervention has left political violence to remain medium high.

Economically, GDP growth is projected at -4.2% in 2025 while the IMF forecast growth to rebound in 2026 to 0%. The cause is quite apparent: the shrinkage of the hydrocarbon sector and declining investment being injected into the state. Diversifying drivers of growth are vital for a positive shift in growth, given Equatorial Guinea’s dependence on oil. The risk of doing business remains very high. Inflation currently is expected at 4% in 2025 before slowing to 3.5% in 2026. Government debt has not seen much movement since the last quarter at 35.1% of GDP in 2025, with the IMF expecting a rise in 2026 to 36.5%. Sovereign non-payment risk therefore remains medium high, while the inability of the government to provide stimulus continues at a medium rate. Equatorial Guinea is one of the six independent states that currently use the CFA Franc, which is pegged to the euro. The Bank of Central African States (BEAC) control policy rates for Equatorial Guinea. Policy rates for the collection of countries had been cut to 4.5% from 5%, to support economic recovery even though the IMF warned the central bank. Finally, exchange transfer remains unchanged at medium high.

Gabon (GAB)

Gabon have continued into Q2 with an overall risk of medium high. Gabon’s military leader General Brice Oligui Nguema, who was the leader in the military coup in 2023, had claimed victory in the states April presidential election. Political interference and legal & regulatory risk are still regarded as high. Nguema gained 90% of the available votes, with opposition being light due to exclusion of some opposition parties that would have posed a threat to the government. In terms of disagreements, the UN court has sided with Equatorial Guinea over their dispute with Gabon, as Gabon believes the uninhabited Islands with potentially oil-rich waters are theirs but the UN disagree. The removal of Gabon soldiers from the largest island, Mbanie, had been ordered by the UN. Political violence remains medium high. Furthermore, Gabon were also part of the five African nations that U.S. president Trump wanted to shift the approach from aid to trade, as he sees the continent of Africa as a more beneficial partner compared to China.

Economically, real GDP is estimated to grow 2.8% in 2025 according to the IMF, and to remain at a stable level in the near future at 2.6% in 2026. Moderate growth is expected for the African state due to reliance on hydrocarbons, with exploration for new oil reserves continuing despite the recent dispute against Equatorial Guinea over the possible oil rich waters. However, economic diversification is apparent with Gabon expanding in sectors such as iron ore and timber, with the start of production appearing at the Belinga iron mine. Investment has been called for at the latest meeting with the Gabon President, the four other African nations and U.S. president Trump. President Nguema wants raw materials processed locally, explaining to Trump that other countries (e.g. China) could seize the opportunity before the U.S. president. Government debt has become a significant issue for Gabon, with the IMF forecasting 79.2% of GDP in 2025, and projected to continue to increase at 83.9% of GDP in 2026. Even so, Gabon gained the backing of 10 financial institutions in late April 2025, with access to new financing. Sovereign non-payment risk remaining high and inability of government to provide stimulus has increased from medium high to high. Inflation is projected at a steady 1.5% level in 2025, and expected by the IMF to reach 2% in 2026. The official currency, the CFA Franc, continues to be backed by the French treasury and pegged to the euro. Exchange transfer risk remains medium due to the pegged currency reducing currency volatility risk and banking sector vulnerability has worsened too medium. Finally, weaker demand from large trading partners like the EU and China can negatively impact their vital export performance. This provides some reasoning for risk of doing business remaining high.

Guinea (GIN)

Guinea’s overall risk remains unchanged into the second quarter at high. Guinea continues to still be under military rule, due to the coup in 2021, led by Lt Col Mamady Doumbouya who is still in power to the present day. Political interference and legal & regulatory both remain high.  Doumbouya had recently announced that elections are scheduled to take place in December 2025, as elections were not organized or had received postponements since the military leader seized power. However, the previous two ruling parties have been suspended, while the main opposition is under surveillance. Political violence is also unchanged at high. In March, the current leader had granted a presidential pardon to the former JUNTA, Moussa Dadis Camara due to health issues. This decision has caused a split in public opinion, while there are current socio-political tensions due to arrests and the removal or disappearance of key political opposition.

In terms of Guinea’s economy, growth is in a very positive position with it currently being forecast as 7.1% by the IMF in 2025. Not only does Guinea’s growth look positive short term, it is projected to rise to 10.6% in 2026. The mining sector continues to be Guinea’s main economic growth driver, with the production of Bauxite maintaining this positive trend through 2025. Recently in August, a subsidiary of Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA) had its bauxite concession revoked escalating tensions over the construction of an alumina refinery with the military government wanting to gain control over the country’s mineral assets. This has limited conversion of bauxite into alumina as there is only one refinery. In addition, iron ore production is expected to start in late 2025. The risk of doing business remains medium high. Inflation seems to be stabilizing, with it currently forecast at a rate of 3.5% in 2025, and projected to reduce down to 3% in 2026 by the IMF. In addition, the IMF estimate Guinea’s government debt to be 39.6% of GDP, projecting it to continue reducing with a figure of 35.1% in 2026. The national currency is the Guinea Franc (GNF), which is still pegged to the euro. Exchange transfer risk remains medium high.

Kenya (KEN)

Overall risk in Kenya continues at a medium high level. William Ruto remains as President of state, since his appointment in 2022 from Deputy president. However, a year into his Presidential role, protests against his administration had been well under way. Political violence remains at a high level with legal & regulatory risk also remaining medium high. There is seen to be quite an ideological mismatch between Ruto and the Kenyan public, with it being suggested that his outlook politically conflicts with the liberal values of many Kenyan people.  Violence, however, continues from this ongoing tension throughout the country. In this context, in late June thousands of protesters took to the streets of the capital, Nairobi, marking one year since the anti-tax demonstrations that had sparked outrage and violence. Confirmation of 16 deaths and about 400 injuries from this protest is only part of the overall tragedy. Similarly, in 2024 the proposed Finance Bill led to violent and fatal protests which lead to the bill being withdrawn. However, in mid-June 2025 Kenya’s parliament had passed the 2025 Finance Law, with major pressure of events repeating themselves. In terms of the Economy, the Finance Law aims to spread the tax base, mainly targeting SEP (significant economic presence) businesses operating on electronic networks. With an increase in tax burden, the risk of doing business continues at a rate of medium high. Kenya is projected to uphold a similar rate of real GDP growth at a steady level of 4.8% in 2025, with further increase to 4.9%, in 2026 projected by the IMF. Growth will be driven mainly through the growth of the population and Kenya’s development growth, with annual inflation rate flatlining in June at 3.8%. However, the centre of Kenya’s problems is the high public debt they have accumulated. With government debt making up 68.3% of GDP and projected to increase to 70.2% of GDP by 2026, the IMF foresees. With a sovereign non-payment risk remaining medium high, the climbing public debt is seen to remain due to persistent budget deficits. Remarks were made by President William Ruto at the London Stock exchange meeting in July in relevance to Kenya’s external debt. Ruto explained how Kenya are planning to privatise a proportion of their state assets through initial public offerings, attracting a larger number of inflows through private sector investment. In addition, the Kenyan Shilling is holding at steady level, since stabilising not long after its record depreciation in 2023/2024. This provides reasoning for an unchanged exchange transfer risk of medium. Supply chain disruption remains medium high. Since June, Trump had demanded a 90-day pause on foreign aid, in particular preventing HIV prevention in Africa but also specifically in Kenya. Thus, the reduction in the supply of medical treatment will ultimately drive cases of HIV upwards throughout the state but also in surrounding countries.

Mali (MLI)

Overall risk in Mali remains high, with military leader Assimi Goita who seized power after military coups held in 2020 and 2021, with Goita planning to stay in power for a minimum of 5 years despite pledges to hold elections. The military Junta in May had led the decision to dissolve all political parties in the Sub-Saharan state, sparking new resistance from political parties due to them demanding the return to democratic rules. In terms of developing economic ties, Mali had strengthened many agreements in relation to mutual trade. Economic ties have been strengthening with Russia since Goita seized power, greater cooperation on nuclear power was explored while there was discussion of cooperation in geological exploration, energy and logistics. However, modest new ties with Russia are countered by relations with France being reduced. Political interference and legal & regulatory risk both remain high. In addition, political violence continues at a rate of very high. In early July, military posts had been under coordinated attacks from militants and Mali armed forces had killed 80 militants in retaliation.

In terms of economy, the IMF forecast very stable growth with a 4.9% in 2025 and to pick-up to an estimated GDP growth of 5.1% in 2026. In recent times, the military leaders of Mali had announced the nationalization of two abandoned gold mines, Yatela and Morila. Mali overall produces 65 tons of gold annually with gold prices remaining strong through this year, due to central bank demand. However, extracting valuable materials from these mines has proved difficult, with the government trying to reopen Barrick’s mine complex, the Canadian mining complex that had been put under state control from a tiresome dispute over tax rates. The risk of doing business continues to be regarded as medium high, while inability of government to provide stimulus has remained at medium high. Inflation is currently sitting at a rate of 3% in 2025, and is forecast by the IMF to slow to 2% in 2026. In addition, Government debt in terms of GDP has been rising in recent years and sits at a rate of 51.7%, with a high proportion being owed to the SOGEM that operates the dam, Manantali and other major projects. In May, Mali was urged to pay up on this regional debt by the SOGEM. However, Government debt is projected by the IMF to reduce to 50.5% in 2026. Sovereign non-payment remains medium high. Mali continues to use the CFA Franc, which is pegged to the euro. Although, exchange transfer risk has remained high due to uncertainty towards important policies and a still large current account deficit.

Senegal (SEN)

Senegal’s overall risk remains medium high, with Bassirou Diomaye Faye holding his presidential role. The next presidential election is not scheduled until 2029, since Faye’s politically unstable election in March 2024. Political interference, however, has improved to medium risk while legal & regulatory risk remains medium. Senegal continues to be seen as the most stable state in Sub-Sahara Africa. Senegal’s relationship with U.S. has been shifting since a meeting with five African nations in July, Senegal being one of them. President Donald Trump told leaders that he wanted to revaluate the United States relationship with the likes of Senegal, converting from aid to trade with the continent. The leaders praised Trump’s peace deals around the world. In addition, plans to take migrants from other countries when they are being deported from the U.S. were presented to Faye alongside the four other African presidents. Political violence is unchanged at medium.

 In terms of the economy, Senegal is projected to see a strong GDP growth rate of 8.4% in 2025, however the IMF forecast a more subdued rate of 4.1% in 2026. The surge in growth in Senegal has been driven mainly by their development in Hydrocarbon production, but also diversification. Diversification includes sectors such as agriculture (employing 70% of the Senegal’s population), tourism and digital services. Dakar is further seen as West Africa’s growing logistical and financial hub, attracting investors to the capital due to the strong economy and past growth. However, the risk of doing business remains medium high. In contrast Senegal’s government debt has restricted the potential expansion of the economy and prohibited further growth. Currently government debt sits at 111.4% of GDP in 2025, the IMF states, and forecast to decline slowly with a rate of 110.6% in 2026.  Since the discovery of the USD13bn of hidden debt in April 2024, which led to the IMF freezing its loan programme, new plans have been developed to form a debt recovery. The recovery plan seeks to finance 90% of the initiative using other domestic resources to avoid reliance on government debt but to also stabilize the state’s finances. Ousmane Sonko, the prime minister of Senegal, recently stated that USD8.16bn of accessible resources are seen to be available from 2025 to 2028, without causing pressure on the state’s debt. Public spending is also projected to see cuts. Sovereign non-payment risk and inability of government to provide stimulus, at the moment, both remain high. On the other hand, inflation is set to continue to stabilize according to the IMF. The IMF forecast is to remain consistent with an inflation rate of 2% for 2025 and 2026. The CFA Franc is pegged to the Euro and therefore shifts with changes in the EUR-USD, but also shifts can be influenced by West African countries under military rule (for example: Burkina Faso). Exchange transfer risk therefore continues at a medium high level.

South Africa (ZAF)

South Africa’s overall risk score remains at medium, with no changes in any of the risk levels in this reporting period. First, the risk of political violence remains high due to high income inequality, poverty and corruption in the country. Structural risks such as high unemployment and logistics bottlenecks remain strong, although power supply constraints partly eased after May. Although the return of power cuts (load shedding) in late Q1 raised concerns about upward pressure on inflation, South African electricity public utility (Eskom) recently reported that the power system is showing resilience in meeting the winter electricity demand, supported by ongoing structural improvements in the generation fleet. The company also noted that there has been no load shedding since May 15 (with only 26 hours recorded between April 1 and July 31). On the political front, even though regard the coalition government relatively successful, the political interference risk remains at medium-high rating due to recent political frictions, as the coalition got tested by the budget and national health insurance, which ensured that legal and regulatory risks to stayed at medium level. Inability of the government to provide stimulus remains medium-high due to fiscal constraints. Despite economic problems such as rising level of public debt and high unemployment rate; the macroeconomic outlook moderately improved in Q2. Even though annual inflation rose to 3.5% yr/yr in July from 3.0% in June due to elevated prices of food and non-alcoholic beverages, it remained within the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB) target range of 3%-6%. The ease of doing business, which is at medium-high, is helped by moderate inflation and improving economic environment. Capital buffers are sound, enabling banks to withstand shocks as banking sector vulnerability remains at medium-low, demonstrating the relative strength of the financial sector. Despite the economic outlook remaining positive on the back of improved investor sentiment; we think there are plenty of upside risks including 30% additional tariffs by the U.S. over South-African origin products. The key for the economic trajectory will be the global developments, tariffs, oil prices and the government’s determination to address the electricity shortages, logistical constraints and financing needs in the medium term.

Sudan (SDN)

Sudan’s overall risk remains at a worrying very high rating. April 2023, was the start of the disagreement between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo, head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Fast forward to Q3 and the civil war continues to separate Sudan. Political interference and legal & regulatory risk both remain very high. In early June, the RSF had made a major advancement when it took control of the area along Sudan’s border with Egypt and Libya. Control of this particular territory first, creates a method of movement from Darfur, the part of northern Sudan the RSF control, to bordering countries. Secondly, such territory is a vital trade location for Dogolo’s forces, facilitating the availability of obtaining reinforcements and resupply from bordering countries like Libya. However, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue to take back control of major urban centres. For instance, the army took back control of Khartoum in March, deploying new arms acquired from the likes of Egypt, Turkey, Qatar and Iran. In addition, the SAF still holds the major urban area, El-Fasher, located in the centre of RAF territory. The army have continued to accuse the UAE of supporting the RSF: one accusation is that the UAE have been launching drone strikes into Sudan, but also allegations of RSF controlled gold mines smuggling metal into the UAE. The UAE deny all of these allegations. The ongoing civil war has devasted infrastructure with empty water stations, destroyed hospitals and continuing blackouts apparent across the entirety of the state. It is estimated USD300bn is needed to reconstruct Khartoum alone and USD700bn for the remaining infrastructure of Sudan. Overall, the sheer number of casualties and displacement has been the major talking point. Most recently in late June, over 40 people were killed in an attack on a hospital in Sudan according to the WHO chief. Thus, the political violence and risk of doing business both suitably remain very high.

In terms of economy, growth has been majorly stunted from the ongoing conflict. The IMF have projected a current GDP growth of -0.4% in 2025, however, expect a surge of growth in the coming years with 8.8% in 2026. However though slight progress has been made with renewed negotiations, no ceasefire agreement has been reached to boost growth. Oil production, one of Sudan dependent resources, has significantly decreased due to the political unrest and major decline of investment. Therefore, inflation is projected by the IMF to be 100% in 2025, and forecasted to decrease to 63.2% in 2026. Furthermore, Government debt has continued to remain at extremely high with levels of 252% of GDP, with the IMF predicting an upcoming decline to 207.4% in 2026. Therefore reasoning for the change sovereign non-payment to very high and exchange transfer risk to remain very high. Finally, the WHO noted that hunger and disease is further spreading through the conflict filled country of Sudan, with famine already apparent. It reported that 25 million people are acutely food insecure and near 100,000 cholera cases recorded since the start of July. Humanitarian aid has become inaccessible due to funding cuts and the ongoing uncertainty of Sudan civil conflict. Supply chain disruption remains very high.

Tanzania (TZA)

Tanzania’s overall risk has remained medium high. President of state remains as Samia Suluhu Hassan who is the current chairperson of Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM Party), which has governed Tanzania since 1977. Political interference sticks at a high level and legal & regulatory risk continues to be medium high. For instance, the leader of the opposition party CHADEMA had been charged with treason in early April, with comments that had supposedly been aimed at the public to create a rebellion and disrupt the upcoming election. Actions from the opposition leader, Tundu Lissu, had led to the CHADEMA party failing to sign the code of conduct document, resulting with the inability to oppose the CCM in the upcoming October election. CHADEMA have had discrepancies with the political system under Lissu, with further threats of boycotting the presidential and parliamentary polls as there are beliefs the system favours the ruling party.

Indications from the IMF forecast 6% growth in 2025 and a positive shift to 6.3% in 2026, promoted by an overall expansion in exports. For instance, higher global demand for agricultural commodities, tourism and gold has and is continuing to improve Tanzania’s terms of trade. Additionally, through the government’s rural electrification program, with USD550mn financed by the International Development Association (IDA), is seeking the improvement of the financial and sustainability of the electricity sector.  Even so, the current account deficit is still forecast at 3% of GDP in 2025. Tanzania’s growth in exports, but also in the exploitation of gas reserves, result in the falling government debt of 47.1% of GDP in 2025 and 45.8% in 2026, forecasted by the IMF. Although a decrease in general government debt is clear, a sizable amount of revenue is allocated to servicing debt. Two arrangements between the IMF and Tanzania are ongoing, with an approximate figure of USD 1bn. This provides reasoning for the rise to medium high risk for sovereign non-payments and an exchange transfer risk remaining at medium. Inflation is projected to remain at a steady level, with 4% in 2025 and 4% also forecasted for 2026. Foreseen steadiness in inflation has thus resulted in the Tanzania central bank cutting their policy rate by 25bps to a rate of 5.75%. However, the risk of doing business remains very high with supply chain disruption continuing at medium. In contradiction, Tanzania’s economic ties are strengthening with the likes of India, China and UAE. Tanzania has the availability of duty-free access to the Indian Market, but also the opportunity of bilateral trade in Indian Rupees.

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