ECB Preview (Jul 18): Policy to Pause Amid Mixed Data
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ECB thinking comes backs onto the radar screen next Thursday. Given the hints from Council members, all policy rates will be held this time around. But markets will be more focused on hints on the speed and timing of further moves, not least after what was one formal dissent last time, and amid wider reservations. A key ingredient will be recent (mixed) economy data but with fresh hints of higher wage pressure (Figure 1) cementing the anticipated stable policy decision. There may also be some retort to German Finance Minister Christian Lindner’s publicly aired doubts this week about the legality of potential ECB crisis aid tools ostensibly for France. But perhaps the key matter will be the still soft credit backdrop, with fresh and potentially very influential insight into the supply side coming from the next Bank Lending Survey due on Tuesday (Figure 2). Overall, the easing window will be left open but far from decisively so.
Figure 1: Wage Pressure Easing Far From Smooth
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Source: Indeed, Eurostat, % chg y/y
Easing Restrictiveness
At the last meeting, all policy rates were cut by the expected 25 bp, with the key deposit rate falling from at an unprecedented 4.0% for the first reduction since 2019. Given splits within the ECB Council, it was no surprise that no formal guidance as to future policy was forthcoming, save to underline that policy will be data dependent and clearly not pre-committing to a particular rate path not least alongside upgraded forecasts for this year and next and to ‘keep policy rates sufficiently restrictive for as long as necessary’.
It remains the case that the ECB is not in the process of making policy expansionary, instead just making it less restrictive; it was suggested in June that it was (then) appropriate to ‘moderate’ the current level of monetary policy restriction. But policy is biting and has more impact to come. Underlying inflation is buckling as the ECB’s persistent price gauges are all under 2% and actually just a couple of notches above the 10-year average prior to the pandemic. Against this backdrop, we still see two more 25 bp moves this year and even the anticipated four further cuts in 2025 will hardly take policy out of a restrictive stance.
Admittedly, the decision to start easing in June came with clear reservations within parts of the Council. Indeed, there seemed to be disagreement about interpreting data; what is/was the basis for assessing how data moved relative to expectations and even an implicit objection to the ECB having a symmetric target! While such reservations may seem excessive, not least questioning the symmetry of the inflation target, aspects of recent data (while mixed) may stoke further caution among the hawks. In this regard, will be the slight pickup in wage pressures (as presented by the monthly Indeed tracker, Figure 1). As such, this may accentuate worries about services price resilience, particularly as official output data for the sector shows y/y growth running near 5%, this implying a solid q/q rate for the last quarter
Even so, there is probably still a view that policy has been hiked relatively aggressively in both speed and extent in what Lagarde in June referred as the first policy phase. This is something we have underlined by suggesting that recent monetary tightening (which also encompasses unconventional moves) has not only been extensive, but possibly excessive. Supporting this notion is the continued weakness in monetary data, especially credit which is barely rising and is very negative in real terms. The question is the extent to which reflects supply weakness or fragility in demand. Recent bank lending surveys suggest both but the last such numbers in April very much suggested fresh and sizeable weakness in credit demand by firms (Figure 2). This makes the next such survey due on Tuesday all the more important but also for other reasons. It is noteworthy that the ECB cites the transmission mechanism as a downside risk to its outlook and this risks continues, if not grows not least given the negative impact from the ECB balance sheet reduction on credit dynamics was very much underscored in the last bank lending survey. This is all the more important as the ECB has no plans (yet) to slow, let alone stop, its unconventional tightening regardless of what and when its reduces official rates. It could be argued that if the ECB purses further balance sheet reduction, then larger/faster conventional easing may be needed!
Figure 2: Weak Credit Demand Continuing
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Source: ECB, % chg & % balance
Policy Outlook
Regardless and far from unsurprising, the ECB is reluctant to plan out any particular explicit path, insistent it is, and will remain, ‘data dependent’ probably most notably on labor costs data and will consider policy on a meeting by meeting basis. We also still feel that neither Fed policy, nor the US$, are likely to delay any ECB move(s).
Partly as the ECB remains focused on the labor costs updates, numbers produced quarterly, but also wants to amass a broad but fresh thrust of added insights, then subsequent rate cuts may only arrive in three-month intervals, ie September and December. Hence, our long-standing view that the ECB may cut only a further 50 bp this year but with President Lagarde implicitly hinting more rate cuts are being considered as the ECB has now entered a third policy phase, ie after hiking and then pausing. However, by year-end more durable evidence of labour costs easing should convince the ECB to continue easing and we see 100 bp further easing through 2025, with the deposit rate then nearing 2% and thus more in line with a perceived neutral setting but hardly moving into a clear expansionary stance. This would chime with ECB Chief Economist Lane’s thinking which suggests that on the basis of inflation moving durably to target as seen in 2025, this would allow policy to veer away from restrictiveness and thus toward an eventual neutral setting of circa-2%!