Sub-Saharan Africa: Country Risk Ratings

Angola (AGO)

Angola retains a medium-high overall risk rating, with governance weaknesses and oil dependence remaining the main constraints. Legal & regulatory risk is very high, political interference is high and political violence and supply-chain disruption are medium-high. President João Lourenço and the MPLA retain firm control of the political system, while restrictions on demonstrations and limited opposition influence continue to weaken accountability. Public dissatisfaction remains elevated because of unemployment, high living costs and the gradual reduction of fuel subsidies. The government has pursued anti-corruption and privatisation reforms, but state-linked companies, opaque procurement and inconsistent enforcement continue to create a difficult business environment. Angola’s closer ties with the U.S. and European partners through the Lobito Corridor have diversified external relationships, although China remains an important creditor and commercial partner.

The IMF projects real GDP growth of around 2.3% in 2026 and average inflation of 12.9%. Higher global oil prices provide near-term fiscal support, but mature fields and structural production decline mean the economy remains vulnerable to a renewed fall in crude output or prices. Angola is seeking African Development Bank budget support and has explored debt-for-development transactions to reduce expensive financing costs. Debt service accounts for a very large share of expenditure, constraining public investment and social spending. Sovereign non-payment risk is medium-high and the government’s inability to provide stimulus is medium. Exchange transfer risk is medium, reflecting a more flexible exchange-rate regime but recurring shortages of hard currency and the kwanza’s sensitivity to oil receipts. The risk of doing business is high and banking-sector vulnerability is medium-low. Banks have improved capital positions, yet sovereign exposure and weak credit transmission remain important. Supply-chain pressures are amplified by poor domestic transport links, unreliable power outside major centres and dependence on imported manufactured goods. Angola’s agriculture, mining and logistics sectors offer diversification potential, especially around the Lobito Corridor, but progress remains slow. Higher oil prices provide temporary breathing room, while governance weaknesses, heavy debt-service costs and dependence on hydrocarbons keep the country’s underlying risk profile elevated.

Equatorial Guinea (GNQ)

Equatorial Guinea remains high overall, reflecting entrenched governance weaknesses and a structurally declining hydrocarbon sector. Legal & regulatory risk and political interference are both very high, while political violence and supply-chain disruption are medium-high and the risk of doing business is very high. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo has ruled since 1979, making the political system one of the most centralised and long-standing authoritarian regimes in Africa. Opposition activity is severely restricted, judicial independence is weak and allegations of corruption and human-rights abuses remain persistent. During Pope Leo’s April visit, attention again focused on political prisoners, detention conditions and inequality. In addition, a U.S. agreement to send third-country deportees to Equatorial Guinea has created further scrutiny of detention and human-rights conditions. The economy remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbons, but mature oil and gas fields are in structural decline. The IMF’s 2026 Staff-Monitored Program follows a contraction in 2025 caused by a large fall in hydrocarbon production, with activity expected to remain weak and international reserves under pressure. The government is attempting to improve public-finance management, non-oil revenue and the business environment, but implementation capacity is limited. Sovereign non-payment and exchange transfer risk are both medium-high, while the government’s inability to provide stimulus is medium. Membership of the CEMAC monetary union and the CFA franc’s euro peg provide monetary stability, but declining export receipts reduce fiscal and external buffers. Banking-sector vulnerability is medium-low, although the financial system remains small and concentrated. Supply-chain challenges reflect weak infrastructure outside the main centres, reliance on imported goods and limited regional connectivity. Equatorial Guinea has one of Africa’s highest income levels on a per-capita basis, but the benefits of hydrocarbon wealth remain unevenly distributed and poverty remains widespread. Without major diversification, improved governance and stronger institutions, declining oil production is likely to keep economic and sovereign risks elevated despite the currency union’s stabilising effect.

Ethiopia (ETH)

Ethiopia remains high overall, with security conditions continuing to dominate the assessment. Political violence is rated very high, while legal & regulatory risk, political interference, supply-chain disruption and the risk of doing business are all high. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party retained overwhelming political control following the 2026 election, but voting could not be completed in parts of Tigray, Amhara and Oromia because of insecurity. The election therefore provided policy continuity without resolving the ethnic, regional and constitutional disputes that continue to drive violence. Fighting and insurgency persist in Amhara and Oromia, the 2022 Tigray peace agreement remains fragile and relations with Eritrea have periodically deteriorated. Political restrictions, arrests and limits on opposition activity also reinforce the high political-interference and legal-risk ratings. Despite this difficult security environment, headline economic growth remains strong.

The IMF projects GDP growth of 9.2% in 2026, while average inflation is forecast at 11.8%. Foreign-exchange and monetary reforms under Ethiopia’s IMF-supported programme have improved price discovery and helped rebuild reserves, but the birr’s depreciation has raised import costs. The Middle East energy shock has added further pressure to fuel and transport prices. Ethiopia also remains dependent on Djibouti for the vast majority of its seaborne trade, making logistics and regional relations important sources of supply-chain risk. Sovereign non-payment and exchange transfer risk are both medium-high. Ethiopia defaulted on its USD1 bln Eurobond in 2023, but progress has been made under the G20 Common Framework. In August, official creditors endorsed a preliminary restructuring agreement with bondholders, advancing the process toward a more sustainable debt profile. The government’s inability to provide stimulus is medium and banking-sector vulnerability is low. The financial system remains shallow and state influenced, which limits direct global-market contagion but also constrains access to credit. Strong coffee, gold and services activity provide upside, yet conflict, debt restructuring and foreign-exchange constraints continue to discourage private investment. Much of the medium-term outlook depends on whether economic liberalisation is accompanied by greater political stability and a durable settlement in the country’s conflict-affected regions.

Gabon (GAB)

Gabon remains rated medium-high overall, as fiscal stress and concentrated political power offset the benefits of substantial natural resources. Political interference is high, legal & regulatory risk and the risk of doing business are high, while political violence and supply-chain disruption are medium-high. President Brice Oligui Nguema has consolidated power following the 2023 military coup and the subsequent transition to civilian rule. His 2025 election gave the new political order a degree of formal legitimacy, but executive dominance, limited institutional checks and the continuing role of military-linked figures mean governance risks remain elevated. The government has promised stronger domestic participation in natural resources and infrastructure, which may support development but also increases uncertainty around regulation and state intervention. Fiscal stress has intensified during 2026. In July, the government revised its budget after weaker revenue, cutting expected receipts by around 22% and widening the financing gap. Public debt is above 70% of GDP, and Gabon is considering up to roughly USD1.5 bln of international borrowing while discussions over a new IMF programme have been delayed. Sovereign non-payment risk remains high, while the government’s inability to provide stimulus has eased from high to medium-high. Gabon remains heavily dependent on oil, meaning higher global prices provide some short-term support, but mature fields and volatile output leave the budget exposed. Exchange transfer risk is medium, supported by membership of the CEMAC monetary union and the CFA franc’s peg to the euro, although regional foreign-exchange rules can delay repatriation of funds. Banking-sector vulnerability is medium-low, reflecting regional regulation and relatively contained financial depth. Infrastructure outside the main cities remains weak, while logistics, electricity and bureaucratic processes contribute to the high risk of doing business. The government’s push to increase domestic processing of manganese and other resources could broaden the economy, but requires substantial investment and regulatory credibility. Gabon’s resource wealth and currency arrangement offer buffers, yet high debt, fiscal slippage and the concentration of political power keep the country firmly in the medium-high risk category.

Guinea (GIN)

Guinea remains high overall, despite the potentially transformative impact of the Simandou iron-ore project. Political violence, legal & regulatory risk and political interference are all high, while supply-chain disruption and the risk of doing business are medium-high. General Mamady Doumbouya has consolidated political control following the post-coup transition and his subsequent presidential victory. Parliamentary elections in 2026 further strengthened the pro-Doumbouya camp, while several major opposition parties remained excluded or dissolved. This concentration of power limits immediate political contestation but weakens institutional checks and keeps the legal environment uncertain. Infrastructure remains a major constraint: an August landslide at a landfill in Conakry that killed dozens of people highlighted weaknesses in urban planning and public services.

Mining remains the main economic driver. Guinea is one of the world’s largest bauxite suppliers and is now beginning to benefit from the enormous Simandou iron-ore project. In August, the IMF reached staff-level agreement on a 41-month Extended Credit Facility, with growth expected to accelerate as Simandou production scales up. The government is also pressing mining companies to increase domestic processing, including new alumina capacity, as it seeks to capture more value from the sector. Sovereign non-payment risk has been downgraded from high to medium-high, while exchange transfer risk and the government’s inability to provide stimulus remain medium-high. Fiscal and external buffers remain limited, while the country is exposed to commodity-price volatility, financing constraints and shortages of cash or foreign currency. Banking-sector vulnerability is medium-low because financial depth is limited, but access to credit remains weak. Guinea’s resource potential is exceptional, yet dependence on mining, governance shortcomings and infrastructure bottlenecks mean the benefits are not automatic. A successful IMF programme, transparent management of Simandou revenue and improvements in electricity, roads and ports could materially strengthen the outlook. Conversely, heavier state intervention, political repression or a fall in global mineral demand would reinforce the current high-risk assessment.

Kenya (KEN)

Kenya remains rated medium-high overall, reflecting a combination of political, fiscal and security pressures. Political violence is rated high, while legal & regulatory risk, supply-chain disruption, political interference, sovereign non-payment risk, the risk of doing business and the government’s inability to provide stimulus are all medium-high. President William Ruto’s administration continues to face public frustration over taxation, living costs and unemployment following the violent protest movements of recent years. With the August 2027 election approaching, fiscal measures and police conduct remain politically sensitive. Security threats from al-Shabaab continue to affect areas near the Somali border and the coast, while climate-related drought and flooding periodically disrupt agriculture and transport. The legal framework is comparatively developed by regional standards, but frequent tax changes, corruption allegations and policy reversals continue to raise operating costs.

The World Bank expects growth of around 4.3% in 2026, with a modest pickup to 4.4% in 2027. Agriculture, tourism, remittances and services remain supportive, but higher energy prices linked to the Middle East conflict have reduced household purchasing power and weakened investment. The Kenyan shilling has been relatively stable and monetary conditions have eased, although the central bank kept its benchmark rate at 8.75% in August as it assessed inflation risks. Kenya’s central challenge remains fiscal. Debt-service costs absorb a large share of ordinary revenue, limiting space for infrastructure and social spending and increasing resistance to further tax rises. Nairobi is discussing a new IMF programme after the previous arrangement ended, while a USD1.25 bln World Bank package is intended to support fiscal and structural reforms. Exchange transfer risk has increased from medium-low to medium, while banking-sector vulnerability remains medium-low, reflecting adequate reserves, remittance inflows and a relatively sophisticated banking system. Sovereign non-payment risk nevertheless remains medium-high because refinancing needs are substantial and global borrowing costs remain elevated. Kenya retains a diversified private sector and strong regional financial role, but fiscal consolidation must be balanced carefully against social stability. Further protests, a renewed currency selloff or setbacks in negotiations with multilateral lenders would quickly increase pressure on the country’s risk profile.

Mali (MLI)

Mali rating remains high overall, with the expanding jihadist insurgency continuing to shape almost every aspect of the country’s environment. Political violence and supply-chain disruption are both very high, while legal & regulatory risk and political interference are high. The military-led government continues to face a widening jihadist insurgency involving Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State-linked groups. JNIM has expanded its geographic reach and financing capacity; in August, a United Nations assessment said a large hostage ransom had helped fund further recruitment and operations. Attacks on roads, fuel convoys and provincial towns have repeatedly disrupted trade and access to essential goods. Mali’s withdrawal from traditional Western security partnerships and closer relationship with Russia have also altered the diplomatic and security environment without ending the insurgency.

The IMF expects growth of around 5.5% in 2026, supported by agriculture, gold and a recovery from the severe fuel shortages of late 2025. Inflation is expected to remain below 3% on average, although the Middle East energy shock creates upside risk. Gold remains the key export and fiscal revenue source. The government has tightened state control over the mining sector and in July created a new body to regulate artisanal gold trade, partly in response to large discrepancies between reported production and exports. The risk of doing business is medium-high, reflecting insecurity, arbitrary regulation, weak infrastructure and the possibility of further disputes with international miners. Sovereign non-payment risk and the government’s inability to provide stimulus are medium-high, while exchange transfer risk is high. WAEMU membership and the CFA-franc peg provide some monetary stability, but sanctions risk, regional political isolation and disruption to trade corridors can still impede payments and access to foreign currency. Banking-sector vulnerability is medium. Mali’s medium-term outlook depends on whether the authorities can secure major transport corridors, normalise relations with regional partners and maintain investment in the gold sector. Without a material improvement in security, even relatively strong headline GDP growth is unlikely to translate into a sustained reduction in country risk.

Senegal (SEN)

Senegal remains rated medium-high overall, with the public-debt position now the most significant constraint on the outlook. Political violence, legal & regulatory risk, supply-chain disruption and political interference are all rated medium, but sovereign non-payment risk is high and the government’s inability to provide stimulus has worsened from high to very high. Political uncertainty increased materially in May when President Bassirou Diomaye Faye dismissed Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko and dissolved the government after months of friction within the ruling camp. The governing movement retains substantial parliamentary strength, but the split between two of the country’s most influential political figures has raised questions about policy continuity. Senegal remains more institutionally open than many regional peers, yet the period of confrontation that preceded the 2024 transition showed that protests can escalate quickly.

Public debt remains the key economic issue. The IMF suspended Senegal’s previous USD1.8 bln programme after discovering that earlier governments had significantly under-reported debt and deficits. Public-sector debt has subsequently been estimated at roughly 132% of GDP at end-2024 and 132% for 2026 by the IMF fiscal monitor, leaving sovereign non-payment risk at high. The government is negotiating a new programme and has begun strengthening public-finance management, including with African Development Bank support. Growth remains strong in headline terms because of new oil and gas production and IMF estimates put 2025 growth at around 6.7%, with the extractive sector continuing to support activity in 2026. Higher energy prices also increase subsidy costs and pressure the budget. The risk of doing business is medium-high and exchange transfer risk is medium-high, reflecting financing pressures and the country’s dependence on regional reserves through the CFA-franc system. Banking-sector vulnerability is medium. Senegal benefits from the CFA franc’s peg to the euro and access to the WAEMU financial system, but domestic banks are exposed to the sovereign and to delayed government payments. Hydrocarbon production provides a major new source of revenue, but debt transparency, political cohesion and the successful negotiation of an IMF-supported adjustment programme will determine whether Senegal can convert that opportunity into a lower-risk profile.

South Africa (ZAF)

South Africa’s overall risk score remains at medium. Political violence risk remains high, rooted in inequality; high unemployment (33.6% in Q2) and corruption. This has prompted a backlash in some areas against immigrants from other South African countries, with protests seen in July. Additionally, infighting in ex-president Zuma’s MK party is causing tensions, while local issues rather than national party bias is becoming more important ahead of November local elections – election results could increase political tensions in some regions. Political interference remains at a medium-high rating due to internal conflicts. While the Government of National Unity (GNU) has shown friction over domestic policy, the administration continues to carry a unified front. The inability of the government to provide stimulus has increased from medium-high to high due to fiscal constraints as high sovereign debt and a narrow tax base continue to dominate. The IMF are projecting that general government debt/GDP at 78.9% in 2026, with a slow creep higher until 2030. The macroeconomic outlook for South Africa remains balanced, supported by moderate inflation and the ongoing lack of electricity power cuts (lower demand, solar and better ESKOM performance). However, high energy prices due to the disruption in the Straits of Hormuz continue to cast a shadow of uncertainty over the horizon. The IMF is forecasting 1.0% 2026 growth followed by 1.3% in 2027. Annual inflation is projected at 3.9% in 2026 by the IMF before slowing to 3.4% in 2027. In the banking sector, solid capital buffers continue to protect institutions from economic shocks, keeping banking sector vulnerability at a medium-low level.

Sudan (SDN)

Sudan remains rated very high overall as the civil war continues to overwhelm political, economic and commercial conditions. Political violence, legal & regulatory risk, supply-chain disruption, political interference, sovereign non-payment risk, exchange transfer risk, the risk of doing business and the government’s inability to provide stimulus are all rated very high. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has entered a fourth year, leaving the country politically fragmented and large areas beyond effective central administration. Fighting, drone strikes and attacks on infrastructure continue despite shifts in territorial control. Humanitarian conditions are catastrophic: millions remain displaced, food insecurity is widespread and aid agencies face severe funding shortages. In July, the World Food Programme warned that around five million people were in emergency or catastrophic hunger, while fuel and fertiliser shortages linked to disruption through the Strait of Hormuz further threatened agricultural production. Economic activity and public services remain severely impaired. Large parts of Khartoum and other cities have suffered extensive damage, electricity generation is far below capacity and many civil servants have experienced long periods without regular pay. Some displaced residents have returned to the capital, but reconstruction is constrained by insecurity, shortages of materials and the absence of functioning finance. The banking sector is rated medium-high, reflecting the damage to branches, payment systems and financial institutions as well as the broader collapse in economic activity. Sudan was already in external-debt distress before the war and has very limited access to international capital, leaving sovereign non-payment and exchange transfer risks at very high. Currency depreciation, multiple exchange rates and shortages of foreign currency make cross-border payments extremely difficult. The government has virtually no capacity for conventional fiscal stimulus, while both sides of the conflict continue to divert resources toward military spending. Even where trade routes remain open, businesses face insecurity, looting, informal taxation and unreliable logistics. A lower risk profile will require a durable political settlement and large-scale international reconstruction support. Until then, Sudan will remain one of the highest-risk operating environments globally.

Tanzania (TZA)

Tanzania remains rated medium-high overall, with the political fallout from the disputed 2025 election continuing to weigh on the outlook. Political interference is rated high and the risk of doing business is very high, while legal & regulatory risk is medium-high. Political violence is rated medium, although political tensions remain significant following the disputed October 2025 election. President Samia Suluhu Hassan was returned to office with an overwhelming reported majority after leading opposition figures were excluded, and the subsequent crackdown on protests drew heavy international criticism. A government inquiry has since acknowledged that at least 518 people died during the unrest. In August 2026, Vice President Emmanuel Nchimbi resigned, adding another element of uncertainty to the political environment. Restrictions on opposition activity, media and civil society continue to undermine institutional confidence even though large-scale unrest has eased.

The economic picture is more positive. The IMF estimates growth of around 5.9% in 2026, with medium-term growth potentially rising above 6% as mining, tourism, agriculture, logistics and infrastructure investment expand. Inflation was around 4% in June, although higher fuel and fertiliser costs linked to the Middle East conflict are creating renewed pressure. Supply-chain disruption is rated medium, reflecting Tanzania’s Indian Ocean access and regional trade role but also persistent infrastructure gaps and dependence on imported fuel. The risk of doing business remains very high because of inconsistent tax administration, local-content requirements, bureaucratic delays, foreign-exchange shortages and uncertainty over regulatory enforcement. Sovereign non-payment risk is medium-high, exchange transfer risk is medium and the government’s inability to provide stimulus is medium. Public debt remains manageable, but revenue mobilisation is relatively weak and the political fallout from the election could complicate access to concessional finance. Banking-sector vulnerability is medium-low, supported by adequate capitalisation and growing financial inclusion. Continued investment in rail, ports, mining and energy could strengthen Tanzania’s long-term outlook, but a durable improvement in country risk will depend on restoring political legitimacy, improving regulatory predictability and ensuring that rapid growth translates into broader gains for households.

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